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RECENT DECISIONS
CARRIERS INTERSTATE COMMERCE No LIMITATION OF LiABILITy PossBI.
WHEN GOODS ARE PREcious METALS, EVEN THOUGH SHIPPER UNDERSTATES

VALUE. -

Defendant, the Railway Express Agency, lost a 50-pound shipment of
raw platinum, of declared value $50. Shipper, in a suit for actual value, contended
that the limitation of liability to declared value included in defendant carrier's
standard express receipt was inoperative to limit shipper's recovery to $50, even
though his agent had intentionally misstated the value, knowing that the shipment
was actually worth over $56,000. The Appellate Division" indorsed the shipper's
contention by modifying the trial court's 2 $50 verdict for the shipper. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the modified judgment, awarding the shipper the full value
of the shipment. Held: a special contract limiting a carrier's liability for loss or
damage caused by it to goods shipped in interstate commerce is invalid to reduce
shipper's recovery to agreed amount, less than the actual value of the goods,
where the limitation is not based on the shipper's choice between a rate for full
value liability and a lower rate for limited liability. W. R. Grace & Co. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 8 N.Y.2d 103, 168 N.E.2d 362 (1960).
The "choice of rates" rules which the Court of Appeals found to be decisive
is a judge-made requirement 4 in carrier's liability cases which has survived over
73 years of congressional legislation in the field of interstate commerce. As harsh
as its application in this case may seem, the rule itself represents judicial leniency 5
in the treatment of common carriers who have failed to deliver the goods.
The metamorphic nature of carrier's liability at common law ranged from
early responsibility for fraud or negligence, 6 through absolute liability for losses,
except those occasioned by acts of God or the king's enemy,7 to liability as an
insurer against the onslaught of all but a few rare meteorological phenomena."
Throughout the history of commerce, carriers have systematically attempted to
limit this general liability by making special contracts with shippers. Courts have
instinctively rejected any such arrangement which purported to exempt the carrier
from liability for his own negligence, 9 or refused to enforce the agreements when
it was shown that the shipper either had no actual notice of the attempt to limit
liability,'0 or had no choice except to agree to the carrier's terms or not ship at all."
At the time of the reception of the common law into the body of law of this
country, a carrier was liable as an insurer but could limit his liability by express
agreement with the shipper.' 2 During the first four decades of the railroad industry in the United States (circa 1830-1870), a monstrous economic empire began to emerge, fostered by a government eager to effect the speedy settlement
of the land by pushing the frontier westward and strengthening the unity of
national life. The resultant abuses of power by railroad managers led to public
agitation and complaint, directed particularly at the open resort to discriminatory

practices by the carriers.' 3 After initial reprisals by individual states, reflected in
1 W. R. Grace & Co. v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 9 App. Div.2d 425, 193 N.Y.S.2d

780 (1959).

2 W. R. Grace & Co. v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 992, 182 N.Y.S.2d
694 (1958).
3 Bissell v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 25 N.Y. (11 Smith) 442 (1862). This case contains one of the earliest discussions of the "choice of rates" rule in this country.
4 See Dorr v. New Jersey Steam Nay. Co., 11 N.Y. (1 Kernan) 485 (1854).
5 Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 360 (1873).
6
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MUCHALL, DOCTOR AND STUDENT 222 (18th ed. 1815).

Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 918, 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 113 (K.B. 1785).
Forward v. Pittard, 1 T.R. 27, 33, 99 Eng. Rep. 953, 956 (K.B. 1785).
Lyon v. Mells, 5 East. 428, 437, 102 Eng. Rep. 1134, 1136 (K.B. 1804).
Davis v. William, 2 Stark. 279, 171 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1817).
Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 379 (1873).
New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 47 U.S. 343, 381 (1848).
I SHARFFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 14 (1931).
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state constitutions 4 and statutes"5 alike, Congress responded to the problem by
subjecting the railroads to federal regulation. The first comprehensive interstate
commerce legislation was embodied in the Act to Regulate Commerce,"6 which
created the Interstate Commerce Commission and set up standards for the determination of fair and reasonable rates to be applied uniformly to the transportation of goods and passengers. The practice of discriminating between shippers
by the use of arbitrary rate differentials was made punishable by fine 7 and imprisonment.'8 The act contained no provision relating to the nature of a carrier's
liability, or the prevalent policy of limiting this liability by special contract. 9 The
law regarding
these special contracts for liability limitation varied from state
20
to state.

Some states held the carrier to his strict common law liability as an insurer
and denied him the right to escape this responsibility in any manner. Others allowed
him to restrict his status as an insurer only to the results of his own acts, while
still others permitted him to limit the shipper's recovery for losses occasioned by
the fault of the carrier. The federal courts held this latter view in those areas
in which the application of the "federal common law" was permitted, before
Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins 2' restricted the concept. Each of these divergent policies was founded on a general recognition of the unequal bargaining position
occupied by the shipper.22 Those courts which permitted any variation of the
strict common law liability required that the variation be based on an express
contract of limitation, distinctly separate from the bare promise to carry, supported
by the promise to pay for carriage. 23 The contract of limitation had to be reasonable and fair, and to satisfy these elements the carrier was obliged to show that
the shipper had made an active choice between alternate rates offered by the
carrier.24
The first congressional treatment of carrier's liability appeared in an amendment to the original act, often called the Carmack Amendment, 2 which, inter
alia, declared that a carrier was liable for the full value of any loss or damage to
goods caused by it; the amendment made unlawful and void those special contracts by which the carrier sought exemption from his statutory responsibility.
The Carmack Amendment was interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,
in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger,8 as an enactment of the "federal common
law" as it then existed, holding that, where the shipper had been offered a choice
of rates, the agreed value put on the goods in order to obtain the lower rate was
a limitation on the recovery which the shipper might have in a subsequent action
for loss or damage to the goods. This part of the act was the forerunner of what
is now Section 20(11) of Title 49 of the United States Code.
A second amendment followed in 1915, known as the First Cummins Amendment, 27 which prohibited the carrier from limiting either his liability or the amount
of the shipper's recovery. The amendment added a proviso that where the
goods were hidden from view and the shipper failed to notify the carrier of the
character of the goods, the carrier might then require the shipper to state, in
14
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IowA CODE ANN. § 1308 (1873).
24 Stat. 379 (1889).
Id. at 382.
25 Stat. 857 (1889).
Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477, 487 (1903).
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 504 (1913).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 380 (1873).
Express Co. v. Caldwell, 88 U.S. 264, 266 (1874).
Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477, 485 (1903).
34 Stat. 593 (1906).
226 U.S. 491 (1913).
38 Stat. 1196 (1915).

art. XI, §§ 12, 15 (1870).
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writing, the value of the goods. This declaration would then serve to limit the
liability of the carrier in the event of loss or damage for which he was responsible.
The Interstate Commerce Commission was authorized to determine fair and
reasonable rates based on such declared value. In treating an attempt by a carrier
to fix the value of recovery to an agreed value (market price at time of shipping),
in the event of loss of a carload of grain shipped while the First Cummins Amendment was in effect, the United States Supreme Court 28 held that such attempts
were declared void by Congress in the amendment, since, in the event the market
price rose while the goods were in transit, the agreement would work to deprive
the shipper of full value recovery. The facts of the case show that the Court felt
that the shipment was neither hidden from view nor of a character unknown
to the carrier and therefore not within the Cummins provision.
In 1916, a third amendment, popularly known as the Second Cummins
Amendment, 29 was enacted, changing only the proviso of the First Cummins
Amendment. By the terms of the new proviso, all property, excepting ordinary
livestock, may be the subject of special limiting contracts based on declared value,
if the carrier has been authorized by the ICC to establish and maintain rates
dependent on the value declared in writing by the shipper. This change in the
law was viewed by the United States Supreme Court0 as a congressional reaction
to what had proved to be a more comprehensive restriction of carriers' ability
to make fair limitation contracts than was found to be desirable.
While it is true that the date of any case decided in any court during the
period of these successive amendments must be carefully noted, the decisions at
this point seem to be in substantial agreement that the "choice of rates" rule determines the validity of a special liability limiting contract. If a choice of rates
is available to the shipper, the special contract is reasonable and fair, and if it is
reasonable and fair it is valid and enforceable. This rule is based on the doctrine
of estoppel. The shipper, having declared or agreed upon a less than actual value
for his goods, to take advantage of the lower freight rate applicable to the lower
value, could not later declare a higher value for recovery in a suit for loss or
damage caused by the carrier. 31
It seems clear that if the action of the shipper in the Grace case is rightly
characterized as a declaration of value, to gain the lower of two rates offered by
the carrier, as the Court of Appeals and the Appellate Division held, then the
application of the choice of rates test to part of the transaction was proper and
the result should stand careful scrutiny. Where the shipment is money or precious
metal the carrier can offer but one scale of rates, based on declared value and
weight.3 2 The difficulty lies in the fact that the result reached in the Grace case
will not stand the ultimate test, as pointed out in the dissenting opinions of Judges
Dye and Van Voorhis in the Court of Appeals.
Simply stated, the facts indicate that a shipper, after deliberately understating
the value of his goods, for the admitted purpose of obaining a lower freight rate,
has been permitted to recover the much higher actual value when the goods were
lost. This kind of double dealing by shippers has been expressly condemned by
the United States Supreme Court,"3 and, where there is fraud shown, it is made
a crime by the Interstate Commerce Act.34 It is necessary to look more closely at
the reasons given by the New York courts for tolerating such a transaction.
The "choice of rates" rule was applied in the Grace case because the courts
28
29
30
31
32
33
Co. v.
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Chicago, Mil. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., 253 U.S. 97 (1920).
39 Stat. 441 (1916).
Adams Express Co. v. Darden, 265 U.S. 265 (1923).
Kansas So. Ry. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639, 651 (1912).
This rate classification is often referred to as the "money rate" or the "gold coin rate."
American Ry. Express Co. v. Lindenburg, 260 U.S. 584, 591 (1922), Adams Express
Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 510 (1913).

49 U.S.C. § 10(3).
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found, or were urged to find, that the transaction consisted of the familiar twopart agreement, the bare contract of carriage and a special contract for limitation
of liability. Because the carrier could not offer the shipper a choice of rates to
support the special agreement, but only the single scale of rates, based on actual
value for a precious metal shipment,3 5 the court struck out the supposed special
contract and reformed the entire transaction as if the shipper had declared the
value of the shipment to be $56,000. The carrier was permitted to set off $139
as the fare for a shipment of platinum weighing 50 pounds and valued at $56,000,
and the shipper was awarded the difference as his recovery.
A carrier was liable at common law for the full amount of money or precious
metals placed with him for shipment, that requirement being based on a rationale
suited to the times. 3 6 More recently, however, the United States Supreme Court
has had occasion to comment on the common law rule:
But that which was public policy a hundred years ago has undergone
changes in the progress of material and social civilization.
37 There is less
danger than there was of collusion with the highwayman.

If faith may be put in this argument, advanced by eminent authority and strengthened by a common-sense perusal of modem business practices, the original reason
for holding a carrier to full liability in the particular case of the disappearance
of money or precious metal shipments has lost its force; it is no longer as necessary to insure that no profit can be made by a carrier who conspires with thieves.
The Court of Appeals seems to have been led to find that the transaction
before them in the Grace case consisted of two contracts by the fact that the
carrier's driver made use of a regular merchandise receipt to record the terms
of the shipment, writing across the face of the form the word "platinum." Unlike the standard merchandise receipt, the regular money receipt normally used
for precious metal shipments has no standard limitation of liability clause, but
merely a space for the insertion of the declared value and the weight of the shipment. The trial court, looking beyond the face of the form to facts not cited
by the Court of Appeals, characterized the use of the merchandise form by the
carrier's agent as mere negligence, induced by the shipper's telephone request to
the carrier's office that an ordinary driver be sent after the shipment, instead of
the usual armed driver normally sent to receive money or precious metal shipments.
Granting that the reluctance of the Court of Appeals to look beyond form
to substance may be viewed as a valid exercise of judicial discretion, it does not
seem to be quarreling over arithmetic to point out that the "gold coin rate" which
should have been applied at the inception of this transaction would not have
been the $139 which the court set off against the shipper's recovery, but the amount
determined by entering the money rate tables with a 50-pound shipment valued
at $50, a rate which is just pennies over the actual merchandise rate charged
35 New York & Honduras Rosario Mining Co. v. Riddle Airlines, 3 App. Div. 2d 457,
162 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316, n. 2 (1957). Speaking of the rate for transporting precious metal
from El Salvador to Miami, the Appellate Division said:
Rate is based on two factors, weight and value. The weight rate is constant.
The value rate is variable, depending on the value declared. (Emphasis added.)
36 Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 918, 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 113 (K.B. 1703):
The law charges this person (common carriers) thus entrusted to carry
goods, against all events but acts of God, and of the enemies of the king.
For though the force be never so great as if an irresistible multitude of
people should rob him, nevertheless he is chargeable. And this is a politick
establishment, contrived by the policy of the law, for the safety of all
persons, the necessity of whose affairs obliges them to trust these sorts of
persons, that they may be safe in their ways of dealing; for else these carriers might have an opportunity of undoing all persons that had any dealings
with them, by combining with thieves, &c ....
37 Express Co. v. Caldwell, 88 U.S. 264, 267 (1874).
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through the negligence of the carrier's agent. There would here seem to be two
basic contracts of carriage from which a court might choose.
The choice made in the Grace case is founded on the proposition that, in
a money shipment, the shipper is bound to declare the actual value and the carrier
is bound to charge the rate applicable to such declared value. But the clear facts
of the case show that the shipper was not so bound. He was, in fact, free to
select any rate he wanted to pay simply by declaring the value set out in the
rate table which corresponded to the desired rate, regardless of the actual value of
his goods. A carrier must assume that the shippers who seek his services not only
know the law but abide by it. While the carrier does not afford a choice of rates
to a shipper of precious metals, there is in fact such a choice, albeit an illegal
choice, open to that shipper by the very nature of the goods shipped. The shipper
of precious metals has the advantage over any carrier in such a transaction because he alone knows the actual value of his goods; he is controlled only by that
portion of the act which applies criminal sanctions to a shipper who undervalues
his goods to gain a preferential rate not available to the truthful shipper. The
Grace decision would encourage more shippers of precious metals to make that
illegal choice - it removes the risk of losing the civil action for full value recovery
if the shipment is lost by the carrier, leaving only the risk of the more easily defended criminal prosecution.
There is authority for the proposition that the Second Cummins Amendment
was an attempt by Congress to return the law of carrier's liability to the position
achieved prior to the Carmack Amendment. 3 If this is true, and it seems implicit in the decisions39 which discuss this aspect, then the rule of Pennsylvania
R. R. Co. v. Hart40 is controlling in the Grace controversy. From the very diverse
nature of goods in commerce it is evident that those specific decisional rules which
may apply to one type of goods are not fully determinative in cases involving certain
other types of goods, although it is equally true that some general principles apply
universally in this area, such as the nature of carriers' liability or their ability to
enter into any limitation contract. There is a striking similarity in the nature of
the goods shipped in the Hart case (race horses) and the goods shipped in the
Grace case, in that the actual value of a race horse is peculiarly within the knowledge of the shipper and not the carrier. So, too, is the value of packaged precious
metals (or unpacked raw platinum, for that matter) 4" known only to the shipper.
In either case the carrier would be required to call in expert help to assay the
actual value if the shipper did not choose to supply it. It is in this context that
the Hart Court said:
The rate of freight is indissolubly bound up with the valuation. If the
rate of freight named was the only one offered by the defendant (carrier),

it was because
the rate of freight named was measured by the valuation
42

expressed.

There are decisions which hold that a fraudulent act of the shipper does not
38

Gold Hunter Mining Co. v. Director General, 63 I.C.C. 234, 241 (1921):
... it is necessary to bear in mind the purpose of the Second Cummins
Amendment, which as stated in the report of the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce, was "to restore the law of full liability as it existed
prior to the Carmack Amendment of 1906" ....
39 Adams Express Co. v. Darden, 265 U.S. 265, 268 (1923).
40 112 U.S. 331 (1884). This case implicitly lays down the rule that, where the exact
value of the goods is known only to the shipper, the value declared by the shipper governs
the entire transaction, even in the event of loss or damage caused by the carrier.
41 W. R. Grace & Co. v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 992, 182 N.Y.S.2d 694
(1958):

The testimony reveals that an ordinary person could not distinguish raw
platinum from sand or other product and could not identify it as a precious

metal.
42 112 U.S. 331, 337 (1884).
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disable him in an attempt to recover full value for loss from the carrier. 4s This
authority, however, predates the decision in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger,
which seems to deny this proposition. The Court said:
On the contrary, it would be unjust and unreasonable, and would be
repugnant to the soundest principles of fair dealing and of the freedom of
contracting, and thus in conflict with public policy, if a shipper should be allowed to reap the benefit of the contract if there is no loss, and to repudiate
it in case of loss. 44

In the Grace case, the Appellate Division asked:

If the carrier is not estopped to recover the legal rate where there has been
mistake, error, or even illegal computation, there seems to be little reason
why the shipper
should be estopped to recover the full value in like
circumstances. 45
Coming as it does from the jurisdiction that sired the Angerosa v. White48 doctrine
of the vitiating effect of fraud upon a contract, this approach is strange, to say the
least. It is amply answered by the United States Supreme Court:
To permit such a declared valuation to be overthrown by evidence aliunde
the contract, for the purpose of enabling the shipper to obtain a recovery
in a suit for loss or damage in excess of the maximum evaluation thus
affixed, would both encourage and reward undervaluations
and bring
47
about preferences and discriminations forbidden by the law.
The Grace court cites its decision in New York & Honduras Rosario Mining
Co. v. Riddle Airlines,48 a case involving a reduced rate of freight for gold and
silver bullion, as authority for the proposition that the shipper can recover the full
value of a precious metal shipment even though he fraudulently undervalues the
shipment in order to gain a lower freight rate. The facts of that case show that
the shipper and the carrier were guilty of collusion, a fact not present in the Grace
case, and a distinguishing factor, as pointed out by Judge Dye in his dissent in
the Court of Appeals decision. Pertinent here is this statement of facts from
Rosario:
TAN (carrier) amended its tariffs (illegally) so as to make available to
its customer a choice of rates ....

Following this amendment of TAN's

tariffs, a number of shipments
were made without incident until the one
in issue. (Emphasis added.) 49

This course of dealing should be compared with the prohibition in Croninger,
quoted above. Rosario seems, in truth, to be encouraging and rewarding forbidden
undervaluation. But in the Rosario case there is, arguably, a basis for such a
result-the carrier was guilty of active collusion.
It is difficult to determine what a carrier is now required to do when he receives a package containing precious metal from a prospective shipper. Must he
open each package and employ assayers or jewelers to determine the actual value
of the contents? Clearly the free flow of commerce, traditionally an imperative
in this country, would be materially obstructed by such a requirement.
Although three sets of operative facts are stated by the three reported opinions
spawned by the Grace litigation, there is sufficient concurrence among them to
43 Visanka v. Southern Express Co., 92 S.C. 573, 75 S.E. 962 (1912). Contra, Adams
Express Co. v. Green, 112 Va. 527, 72 S.E. 102, 104 (1911):
It seems to be established in England and in this country by the weight of
authority, and by the better reason, that where the shipper misrepresents
the character of a package for shipment, or misleads the carrier as to its
value, he can in case of loss only recover its apparent value according to
the representation made; and especially is this true where the representation
was made in order to obtain a lower rate of charges.
44 226 U.S. 491, 511 (1913).
45 193 N.Y.S.2d 780, 786 (1959).
46 248 App. Div. 425, 290 N.Y.S. 204 (1936). For a survey of the effect of fraud
upon a contract in New York, see 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 559 (1960).
47 Kansas So. Ry. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639, 652 (1912).
48 3 App. Div. 2d 457, 162 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1957).
49 Id at 316.
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warrant charging the shipper with at least civil fraud, both in intentionally understating the value of the shipment and in requesting that the express company send
a regular driver to handle the package, instead of the armed and experienced
driver who would customarily make such pick-ups. This is set off against the
negligence of the carrier's agent, apparently due to inexperience at handling money
shipments. In the New York scales, the heavier sin would seem to be negligence.
Ralph H. Witt

FOREIGN APPLICATION OF LOUISIANA "DIRECT ACTION"
CONFLICT OF LAws Parents
JOINDER OF AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURER PERMITTED. STATUTE -

of deceased automobile guest, who was fatally injured in an automobile accident
in Louisiana, brought action against driver of automobile in Texas, and driver's
insurer was joined in the action under the Louisiana direct action statute, giving
an injured person or his survivors or heirs a right of direct action against a liability
insurer. Insurer's motion to abate the action against it and drop it as a party to
the suit was granted. After a jury determination adverse to the plaintiffs, appeal
was taken to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals. Held: reversed and cause remanded. Joinder of driver's insurer as a defendant was proper. Powell v. Penny,
336 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
This decision brings to the fore significant questions in conflict of laws, such
as the nature of the foreign direct action statute, i.e., whether substantive or procedural; the effect of the venue provision of the statute when the latter is sought
to be applied extraterritorially; the effect of the requirement of full faith and credit
under the federal Constitution; and considerations of public policy.
The enactment of the Louisiana direct action statute,' and its subsequent
amendments, 2 allowing the insurer to be sued immediately and alone in all cases,
represents the most far-reaching legislative endeavor of all the states in improving
the position of a person negligently injured in his attempts to recover from the
tortfeasor's insurer. The portion of this unique3 statute peculiarly relevant to this
discussion provides:
The injured person or his or her survivors, or his heirs hereinbefore
referred to at their option, shall have a right of direct action against the
insurer within the terms and limits of the policy in the parish where the
accident or injury occurred or in the parish where the insured or insurer is
domiciled, and said action may be brought against the insurer alone or
against both the insured, jointly and in solido, at either of their domiciles
or principal place of business in Louisiana. This right of direct action shall
exist whether the policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in
the State of Louisiana or not and whether or not such policy contains a proprovided the accident or injury occurred
vision forbidding such direct action,
4
within the State of Louisiana.

Upon proof of the insured's negligence, therefore, a judgment may be had by or
on behalf of the injured party directly against the liability insurer.
The present case can perhaps be most appreciated by contrasting it throughout
with what has been a case of major impact in automobile insurance liability,
Morton v. Maryland Casualty Co.s In that case, the Appellate Division of New
1 La. Acts 1918, No. 253.
2

LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 25:655 (1956).

3 Wisconsin has a similar direct action statute which allows joinder of the tortfeasor and
the liability insurer. Wis. STAT. §§ 85.93, 260.11 (1955). Rhode Island has a statute which
permits a direct suit against the insurer if service upon the insured cannot be effected within
the state. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 27-7-1, 27-7-2 (1956).
4 LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1956). Note that all actions brought under this statute
arise from accidents or injuries which occur in Louisiana.

5 1 App. Div. 2d 116, 148 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1955), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 488, 176 N.Y.S.2d 329,
151 N.E.2d 881 (1958).
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York refused to allow the maintenance of a suit against the insurer brought under
the Louisiana act. It based its decision on two grounds: first, that the interpretation of the direct action statute required that the action be brought in the specified
parishes of Louisiana, and, second, that the Louisiana right of action contravened
public policy based upon the New York rule that evidence of a tortfeasor's insurance,
or any intimation of such, is ordinarily inadmissible and improper in a negligence
action. The Court of Appeals, in review, affirmed this holding but did so solely
upon the ground of interpretation of the venue provisions. The apparent rationale
behind this shall be explained below. Though the Court of Appeals has deemed
it unnecessary, in order to refuse enforcement, to consider the question of public
policy, it is appropriate to examine the intermediate court's reasoning on this matter since it may be of concern in other jurisdictions where the issue may arise.
In Powell, the first problem necessitating resolution was that of characterization of the Louisiana statute as being substantive or procedural, inasmuch as recognition of an imported statute will only be given where it creates a substantive
right;6 in matters of procedure the law of the forum will be deemed binding. As
to the actual determination of this question, the courts of both Texas 7 and New
Yorks follow the well-settled rule that the forum will make its own characterizations
of foreign law based upon its own rules of construction. 9 Maintaining their independence in such determination, the forum courts will, nonetheless, usually look
for guidance to the characterization given the statute by the courts of the state of
its creation, particularly, as well as the courts of other jurisdictions. There has
been a good deal of judicial divergence regarding the nature of the statute. Early
Louisiana cases denominated the statute as procedural and remedial ° and courts
of other jurisdictions took their cue from these cases. 1' Subsequently, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held, for intrastate purposes, that the right given by the direct
action statute constituted a substantive and not a procedural right.12 These decisions
were relied upon by courts in Other jurisdictions to permit enforcement of imported
statutes.13 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has given its implicit
recognition to the latter proposition in a non-conflicts decision.' 4 There has also
been an inconsistency in the charaoterization of the two other direct action statutes.-5
6 Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935); Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286
U.S. 145 (1932).
7 Shelton v. Marshall, 16 Tex. 344 (1856); Wells v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 132
F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1942).
8 Murray v. New York, O.&W.R. Co., 242 App. Div. 374, 275 N.Y.S. 10 (1934).
9 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws, § 584 (1934); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 81
(3d ed. 1949).
10 Burke v. Mass. Bond & Ins. Co., 209 La. 495, 24 So. 2d 875 (1946);'Reeves v. Globe
Indem. Co., 185 La. 42, 168 So. 488 (1936); Stephenson v. List Laundry & Dry Cleaners, 182
La. 383, 162 So. 19 (1935); Churchman v. Ingram, 56 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 1951); Robbins
v. Short, 165 So. 512 (La. App. 1936).
11 Wells v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 132 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1942); McArthur v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 184 Miss. 633, 186 So. 305 (1939), in which the Mississippi court abandoned its own prior characterization by overruling Burkett v. Globe Indem. Co., 182 Miss. 423,
181 So. 316 (1938), and invoking the characterization given by the Louisiana courts.
12 West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950); Jackson v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 211 La. 19, 29 So. 2d 177 (1946).
13 Collins v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 802 (1956); Chambless v. Nat'l. Industrial Laundries, 149 F. Supp. 504 (E.D. Tex. 1957).
14 Lumberman's Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954). Following the characterization of
the Louisiana courts that the statute created a separate right of action, diversity of citizenship
was held to exist by the Court, despite Louisiana citizenship of both injured party and insured.
Language aside, it is implicit in the result that the right was considered to be substantive since,
if it were procedural, it would have been improper for the federal court to apply the statute.
See also Watson v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), in which the Louisiana direct action statute was held constitutional as to an insurance contract made and issued
outside Louisiana.
15 For Wisconsin cases holding the statutory right to be procedural, see Ritterbusch v.
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In view of the more recent holdings as to the nature of the statute by the Louisiana
courts, which must now be recognized as the law in that state, and the persuasive
support given them by the United States Supreme Court, itis likely, in following
the usual practice of looking to the courts of the enacting state, that the statute
henceforth will be dealt with as conferring a substantive right against the tortfeasor's insurer. 1 6 It seems proper to analogize to the Louisiana intrastate holdings
for purposes of conflict of laws. Over and above consideration of which court's
denomination should be followed, it appears that the statute does establish a new
right of action, as opposed to simply designating an additional party defendant or
avoiding circuitous litigation. This right vests upon the occurrence
of the accident,
7
subject only to such defenses as the tortfeasor may invoke.1
On the point of the substantive nature of the Act, both Powell and Morton
are in agreement. They part company, however, in the interpretation of the venue
provision of the Louisiana statute. The statute provides that the right of action
given shall be exercised "in the parish where the injury occurred or in the parish
where the insured has his domicile." 8 The controversy revolves around whether
the venue restriction is so inextricably a part of the right of action as to deny extraterritorial enforcement. The Court of Appeals in Morton, in affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit, treated this limitation as substantive, i.e., itis indispensable to the cause of action itself. The Appellate Division, in maintaining that
the venue provision constituted an integral part of the substantive right conferred,
analogized to wrongful death cases holding that where a right of action for wrongful
death incorporates a time limitation for the bringing of an action, the limitation
isan intrinsic and inseparable part of the right and is controlling where the action
is brought in a sister state, even if that state has prescribed a longer period. It is
not to be treated as a separate statute of limitations.' 9 Though the wording of the
direct action statute would seem to compel that finding, the general rule, followed
in Powell,'0 is that such a personal right of action, transitory in nature, may be
enforced anywhere, but the method of enforcement does not follow the right.
Thus, venue is no part of the right.2 It cannot be maintained that the Louisiana
legislature intended to create a right of action enforceable only in Louisiana, to
the exclusion of all sister states.
In Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. George,2 2 the United States Supreme
Sexinith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N.W.2d 611 (1950); Oertel v. Williams, 214 Wis. 68, 251 N.W. 465
(1933). Other cases interpreting the Wisconsin statute are Torcazo v. Statema, 141 F. Supp.
769 (N.D. Ill.
1956) (substantive); Anderson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Minn.
428, 24 N.W.2d 836 (1946) (procedural); Lieberthal v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 316 Mich. 37,
24 N.W.2d 547 (1946) (apparently substantive); Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242 N.W.
329 (1932). For a case holding the Rhode Island statute to be substantive, see Lundblad v.

New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 265 Mass. 158, 163 N.E. 874 (1928).

16 See Chambless v. Nat'l. Industrial Laundries, 149 F. Supp. 504 (E.D. Tex. 1957).
17 The stipulations between the insured and the insurer requiring notice within a specified
period of time after the accident and requiring that a judgment first be rendered against the

insured tortfeasor before an action can be brought against the insurer are not available as
defenses in a "direct action" suit. West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950);

Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 211 La. 19, 29 So. 2d 177 (1946).
18
19

LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655.
Weiss v. Baviello, 133 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1954); Schwertfeger v. Scandinavian-American

Line, 186 App. Div. 89, 174 N.Y.S. 147 (1919), aff'd, 226 N.Y. 696, 123 N.E. 888 (1919).
Strangely enough, however, the New York courts in those cases rule that they are bound by the

interpretation of the Connecticut statute given by the supreme court of that state. See note 8
supra.
20 "These provisions... go to the remedy and not the right." Powell v. Penny, 336 S.W.2d
224, 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
21 Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.
Co. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55 (1909). This must also be the logical outcome of Lumbermen's
Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954), since it permits suit in the federal court, thus overriding the local venue requirements.
22 233 U.S. 354 (1914).
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Court considered a provision of the Alabama Code which gave an employee a
right of action against his employer for injuries sustained from defective machinery,
and which, at the same time, purported to reserve such causes of action exclusively
to the courts of Alabama. The Court held that a state cannot create a transitory
cause of action and simultaneously destroy it by a venue restriction. Confronted
with this case, the Court of Appeals in Morton, in a doubtful approach, distinguished the George case on the ground that the venue provisions of the Alabama
statute were not physically within the statute creating the right of action, but in
a separate section of the code entitled "Venue"; they were not, the New York
court said, a substantial part of the statute. The New York court also relied upon
a Louisiana Supreme Court case in which failure to bring the action in one of the
specified parishes was held fatal to the action, the court of the insurer's agent's
parish being without jurisdiction. 23 However, this position is not necessarily irreconcilable with the view taken in the Powell case. There is no question but that
the venue provision will be strictly adhered to within the state of Louisiana, and
this should have no bearing upon another state in which the proper consideration
should be whether that restriction is binding beyond the borders of the enacting
state at all. Failure to meet the venue requirements within Louisiana does not,
of necessity, mean that the provision is an intrinsic part of the statute.
The court in the present case found the ruling in George to be controlling and
dismissed any consideration of the manifest intent of the Louisiana legislature to
give extraterritorial effect to its venue provisions in concluding that these provisions
should be characterized as procedural and that Texas was not bound by them.
It appears that, although denominating the statute substantive, the New York
court is, in effect, holding it to be procedural by the interpretation given the venue
provision.
Even when this problem of characterization of the statute is overcome to the
satisfaction of a court, there remains the task of determining whether the imported
statute is reconcilable with the public policy of the forum state. One of the principal
purposes of the conflict of laws doctrine is the realization of uniformity of result in
a specific instance, regardless of where the action is brought. 24 That uniform recognition and enforcement of rights, in interstate activity, is ideal is apparent. The
full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution 25 requires that each
state enforce the statutes of its sister states. H6wever, this requirement is not without exception. As a general rule, a state need not give recognition to an enactment
of another state if the statute is violently opposed to the public policy of the forum
state. 26 However, whether the public policy of a state is strong enough to preclude
enforcement of a foreign-created right is subject to review by the United States
Supreme2 7Court. In the absence of a conflict with public policy, recognition will be
required.

In Texas, courts have refused direct actions against the insurer by the injured
person, holding that the plaintiff must bring his action within the terms of the
policy before he may recover, i.e., recognition has been given to the validity and
binding effect of the "no-action" provisions which are almost invariably included
in insurance policies or in statutory requirements." Refusal to allow direct actions
23

24

Miller v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 199 La. 515, 6 So. 2d 646 (1942).
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 4 (3d ed. 1949).

25

U.S. CONST. art.

IV, § 1.

26 First Nat'l. Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S.
609 (1951); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941); Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper,
286 U.S. 145 (1932).
27 First Nat'l. Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S.
609 (1951).
28 Moxon v. Ray, 125 Tex. 24, 81 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Com. App. 1935); Grasso v. Cannon
Ball Motor Freight Lines, 125 Tex. 154, 81 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Com. App. 1935); American
Fid. & Cas. Co. v. McClendon, 125 Tex. 41, 81 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Com. App. 1935); Kuntz v.
Spence, 67 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Com. App. 1934).
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against the tortfeasor's insurer in Texas were not based upon considerations of

public policy. 29 Furthermore, the actions were not brought under the Louisiana
direct action statute.
In Powell, where joinder was sought under the Louisiana direct action
statute, the court found a favorable expression of Texas public policy, respecting
direct action through joinder of the liability insurer and the insured as co-defendants, in specific statutory provisions. By a Texas rule of procedure it was provided
that joinder of a liability or indemnity insurance company shall not be allowed
"unless such company is by statute or contract liable to the person injured or
damaged."30 Contract liability cannot be invoked because the contract does not
provide for direct action by the injured party, but rather contains the standard
no-action" clause. Therefore, joinder could be had only by statutory permission.
The defendant-appellee contended that the rule of procedure contemplated
a domestic Texas statute and not the Louisiana act. However, this contention was
overcome by a Texas statute.3 '
By a specific statutory enactment, the right of all citizens to have redress in
Texas courts on the basis of the law of a foreign jurisdiction is clearly granted.
This is an unquestionable expression of a favorable public policy in that state.
However, other jurisdictions, not having this type of statute, find the question
of public policy much more difficult to resolve. It is interesting to note the rationale
employed by the New York Appellate Division in Morton v. Maryland Casualty Co.
The primary policy factor presented in Morton, which conflicts with the policy
of uniform enforcement of foreign-created rights, and which is the ground for
the finding that the Louisiana statute is objectionable, is that of keeping from
the jury any inkling that the defendant is insured. The theory is that knowledge
of insurance would prejudice the jurors' minds to the extent that there might be
an unjust increase in the amount of damages given. Several New York cases indicate
the great emphasis that the courts of that state have attached to evidence
of in33
surance.3 2 This theory has also been invoked in several other states
4
In other jurisdictions, the public policy determination
has been divergent.
29 But see, American Indem. Co. v. Martin, 126 Tex. 73, 84 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Com. App.
1935).
30 TFx. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 97, Sec. (f).
31 Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 4678:
Whenever the death or personal injury of a citizen of this State or of the
United States, or of any foreign country having equal treaty rights with the
United States on behalf of its citizens, has been or may be caused by the
wrongful act, neglect or default of another in any foreign State or country
for which a right to maintain an action and recover damages therefor is
given by the statute or law of such foreign State or country, such right of
action may be enforced in the courts of this State within the time prescribed
for the commencement of such actions by the statutes of this State. The law
of the forum shall control in the prosecution and maintenance of such action
in the courts of this State in all matters pertaining to the procedure. (Emphasis added.)
32 Simpson v. Foundation Co., 201 N.Y. 479, 490, 95 N.E. 10, 15 (1911), wherein it was
said: "Evidence that the defendant was insured . . . is incompetent and so dangerous as
to require a reversal even when the court strikes it from the record and directs the jury to
disregard it. . . ." (Emphasis added.) See also, Rodzborski v. American Sugar Refining Co.,
210 N.Y. 262, 104 N.E. 616 (1914); Akin v. Lee, 206 N.Y. 20, 99 N.E. 85 (1912); Cosselmon
v. Dunfee, 172 N.Y. 507, 65 N.E. 494 (1902); Lerner v. Morris, 283 App. Div. 885, 129
N.Y.S.2d 440 (1954).
33 James Stewart & Co. v. Newby, 266 Fed. 287 (4th Cir. 1920); Watson v. Adams, 187
Ala. 490, 65 So. 528 (1914); Roche v. Llewellyn Ironworks Co., 140 Cal. 563, 74 Pac. 147
(1903).
34 In Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918), Chief Judge Cardozo
espoused what has become recognized as the classic statement regarding this determination. A
state cannot refuse to enforce a foreign law if the enforcement does not violate "some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the commonweal."
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In Mississippi,3 5 Minnesota,"' and Massachusetts, 37 actions were allowed, none of
the courts finding any public policy of the state being outraged by enforcement
of a foreign direct action statute. In Michigan, 38 enforcement was refused under
a specific statutory provision prohibiting knowledge by the jury of, or reference to,
insurance in a tort action.
At the very least, denial on the basis of public policy is no longer justifiable in
New York. Shortly after the Appellate Division's judgment in Morton, a new
statute was enacted, the Moior Vehicle Financial Security Act,39 providing virtual
assurance that most car owners will be insured. Hereafter, the average juror in
New York will almost certainly be aware that a tort defendant has insurance.
It would appear that this is why the Court of Appeals in the Morton case, affirmed
one year after the enactment of the financial security statute, ignored the question
of public policy, limiting itself to consideration of the Louisiana venue provision.
The evidence question remains real and disturbing in other jurisdictions.
Further observations may controvert the rationale behind the rule. It may be
speculated that a jury will assume that a defendant tortfeasor is insured, or that
the defense is conducted by an insurance company, because of the widespread
fact of automobile liability insurance. It should be noted, also, that, where it is
felt that knowledge of insurance has resulted in an unreasonably high award of
damages, the court may reduce or set aside so much of the reward as it thinks
unreasonable.
It appears, therefore, that foreign application of the Louisiana statute, since it
allows direct action, with its consequent avoidance of multiplicity of suits, increases the number of forums available to the plaintiff because liability insurers
are often operating in many states. The Texas decision also negates such defenses
as failure of notice by the insured and the standard "no-action" clause. It has
more advantages than disadvantages. Its desirability can, perhaps, be more fully
appreciated under the circumstances of Powell, in view of the close proximity of
Louisiana and Texas and the naturally substantial flow of travel between those
two states.
Raymond Brown
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QUIRING JUST COMPENSATION FOR TAKING OR DAMAGING PRIVATE PROPERTY Is
NOT SELF-ExEcUTING. - Abutting landowners alleged that Salt Lake County lowered the grade of their street some 16 feet below the previous level, thus destroying
their means of ingress and egress. Plaintiffs sought either damages or a writ of
mandamus requiring the county to institute condemnation proceedings to assess

damages. On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from a denial of summary judgment for defendants, held: reversed. The constitutional provision requiring just
compensation is not self-executing, and in the absence of statutory consent the state
may not be made a party to suit. Fairelough v. Salt Lake County, 354 P.2d 105
(Utah 1960).
It is the universal holding that neither the federal nor a state government may
35 Burkett v. Globe Indem. Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316 (1938) overruled without
mention of the public policy issue in McArthur v. Maryland Cas. Co., 184 Miss. 633, 186 So.
305 (1939). See note 11 supra.
36 Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242 N.W. 329 (1932) (Wisconsin direct action
statute).

37

Lundblad v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 265 Mass. 158, 163 N.E. 874 (1928)

Island direct action statute).
38 Lieberthal v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W.2d 547 (1946)

statute).
39
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be sued by a citizen without its consent.' This governmental immunity seems to be
based on the old common law maxim "The King can do no wrong." When the
individual sovereign was replaced by the concept of popular sovereignty, the idea
persisted. 2 Many reasons have been advanced in its support.3 However, in all jurisdictions statutory consent to be sued has been given, 4 usually restricted to particular
causes of action.5 Such statutes are generally strictly construed because they are
considered to be in derogation of the sovereign's right to immunity, and the plaintiff-citizen must follow the statutory procedures precisely or run the risk of having
his case dismissed.7 The consent is often conditional or limited,
as, for example,
8
to suit in the state courts only and not in the federal courts.
If the court in Fairclough had found that the constitutional provision in question was self-executing, i.e., that it required no statute to make it effective, then
presumably the suit would have been allowed.9 "Self-execution" is either an exception to sovereign immunity, 10 or a waiver of it."'
In construing constitutional provisions, courts commonly begin with the presumption that the provisions are self-executing; this follows from the fact that
present state constitutions often contain provisions associated with legislative action.
A constitutional provision that resembles legislative action will therefore take effect
as legislation.' 2 This has not always been true; the federal constitution and early
state constitutions established a broad framework of basic principles - leaving actual
implementation to the legislature. Under this sort of constitutional provision, the
argument against self-execution is more persuasive.
A constitutional provision is generally said to be self-executing if it fulfills the
following requirement:
[I]t can be given effect without aid of legislation and there is nothing to
indicate that legislation is contemplated to render it operative, and . . .
there is a manifest intention that it should go into immediate effect, and no
ancillary legislation is necessary3 to the enjoyment of a right given, or the
enforcement of a duty imposed.'

In an illustrative case, where there was no statutory provision for disqualification of a probate judge on the basis of bias, the Minnesota Supreme Court nevertheless held the judge disqualified under a constitutional provision which read,
"Every person ought to obtain justice freely and without purchase; completely and
without denial."' 14 It was there said that "prohibitive clauses of a constitution are
1 Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824). Accord: Copper S.S. Co. v.
Michigan, 194 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1952); Kleban v. Morris, 363 Mo. 7, 247 S.W.2d 832
(1952); Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So. 2d 321 (1948).
2 PROSSER, TnE LAW OF TORTS 770-771 (2d ed. 1955).
3 For a succinct statement of the theories behind the doctrine, see Hagerman v. City of
Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 66 P.2d 1152 (1937).
4 See 42 A.L.R. 1464.
5 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2 at 771.
6 E.g., Floyd v. North Carolina State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 241 N.C. 461, 85
S.E.2d 703 (1955); Jeff Hunt Mach. Co. v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 217 S.C.
423, 60 S.E.2d 859 (1950); Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Comm'n, 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397

(1947).

7 Shuey v. Michigan, 106 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Mich. 1952). Plaintiff should have brought

his action in the Michigan Court of Claims, which was established to hear cases against the

state; accord, McPheeters v. Board of Medical Examiners, 74 Cal. App. 2d 46, 168 P.2d 65
(1946).
8 Copper S.S. Co. v. Michigan, 194 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1952).
9 See note 15 infra, and accompanying text.
10 Sale v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 242 N.C. 612, 89 S.E.2d 290 (1955).
11 Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170, 213 P.2d 911 (1950).
12 People v. Carroll, 3 N.Y.2d 686, 148 N.E.2d 875 (1958).
13 Latting v. Cordell, 197 Okla. 369, 172 P.2d 397, 399 (1946); accord, State v. Sims,
138 W. Va. 244, 77 S.E.2d 122 (1953); State v. Bliss, 156 Ohio St. 147, 101 N.E.2d 289
(1951).
14 MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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always self-executing and require no legislative provisions for their enforcement." 5
shall
The Utah constitutional provision in Fairclough read, "Private property
'
- As would
not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."'
seem proper, most courts have held similar provisions self-executing. 17 In a lea4;ng
California case the court stated that such a provision
•..is a restriction placed by the Constitution upon the state itself ...,
itcannot be said the mere failure of the legislature to enact a statute
allowing suit to be brought against the state entitles the state to disregard
and violate the limitation. The logical inference is that said constitutional
provision is intended to be self-enforcing.'s

The Fairclough court, in spite of overwhelming authority to the contrary, decided
that Utah's just compensation provision is not self-enforcing; the state may in effect
take private property without any compensation.
The power of the state to take private property is commonly denominated "eminent domain."' 9 This power exists along with and as a concomitant necessity of
sovereignty. 20 Constitutions do not grant the power but recognize it and circumscribe
it, requiring that its exercise be for a public purpose and that just compensation
be paid for property taken. 2' As a result of these constitutional restraints, eminent
domain is said to mean the "right of the sovereign to acquire private property for
public use upon making just compensation .... ,,22 Since the power exists as a
necessary element of sovereignty, every state and the federal government possess it.
The power is customarily exercised pursuant to statute, through
23 condemnation
proceedings, which are neither actions at law nor suits in equity.
Usually the state brings condemnation proceedings to acquire land needed for
highways or other purposes and the court ascertains damages to be paid the owner.
However, situations do arise, as. in Fairclough, where the state or its agencies do
not do so, but merely take the land, or destroy a property interest of the owner
(such as an easement appurtenant of ingress and egress). In this situation, the
theory of inverse eminent domain is applicable. This theory derives its name from
the fact that in ordinary proceedings just compensation is paid before the state
acquires land or an interest in land; in the inverse situation, the state is found liable
for just compensation after it appropriates the land.24 The taking remains an
exercise of the power of eminent domain, even though it precedes a mature right
to compensation.
Unlike an exercise of the police power, where there is no recognized taking
but only regulation, the power of eminent domain requires, by definition, a taking.
15 Payne v. Lee, 222 Minn. 269, 24 N.W.2d 259, 264 (1946); but see, State v. Parker,
150 Ohio St. 22, 80 N.E.2d 490, 492 (1948), wherein the court said: "Although the constitutional provision prohibits lotteries .. .it is not self-executing in that it prescribes no penalty
for its violation." People v. Western Airlines, 42 Cal. 2d 621, 268 P.2d 723, 732 (1954),
appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 859 (1954), is to the contrary on the effect of omission of penalties.
16 UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 22.
17 E.g., County of Mohave v. Chamberlin, 78 Ariz. 422, 281 P.2d 128 (1955); Tomasek
v. State, 196 Ore. 120, 248 P.2d 703 (1952); Schmutte v. State, 147 Neb. 193, 22 N.W.2d
691 (1946). For a collection and discussion of earlier authorities, see Chick Spring Water
Co. v. State Highway Dep't., 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 (1931).
18 Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505, 510 (1942).
19 The phrase seems to have been first used by the Dutch jurist, Grotius. See MORTON,
INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN 1 (1960).
20 For a broad interpretation see Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
21 North Carolina appears to be the only exception, but the right to compensation is
nevertheless recognized because it is demanded by natural justice. Sale v. State Highway &
Pub. Works Comm'n, 242 N.C. 612, 89 S.E.2d 290 (1955).
22 JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN 2 (1953).
23 Id. at 302. For general outline of statutes see id. at 302-310.
24 Moeller v. Multnomah County, 218 Ore. 383, 345 P.2d 813 (1959); Padesta v.
Linden Irrigation District, 141 Cal. App. 2d 38, 296 .2d 401 (1956). Courts have tradi-

tionally used this theory, though not under this appellation. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. City
of Newport News, 105 Va. 108, 52 S.E. 821 (1906).
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Thus in order to bring suit under the theory of inverse eminent domain, the complainant must first show to the court's satisfaction that the taking was an appropriation of property, and not a permissive regulation. 25 Where the state has appropriated the entire fee of the landowner there has not been too much difficulty in
finding a taking.26 The less the taking resembles appropriation of a fee, the closer
Damage resulting
it approaches the area of regulation under the police power.
7
from such exercise is generally considered not compensable.1
The court in Fairclough made the gratuitous assumption that a change in the
grade of the street was a reasonable exercise of the police power. If such were the
case, then the discussion of the constitutional provision involved was superfluous; it
is generally conceded that injury resulting from exercise of the police power is noncompensable. The truth of the matter is that destruction of the right of access to
abutting property by a change of street grade is today generally held to require
compensation, especially under constitutional provisions, such as Utah's, which
specifically mention "taking or damaging." 2s
The progress of the law is generally hesitant, at times almost imperceptible.
Perhaps the Utah court is here adding a new dimension to the judicial consideration of the police power and resultant damage to property. Thus, if the initial
assumption of the court, that this is a reasonable exercise of the police power, is
accepted at face value, then perhaps the court, by relating the discussion of the
constitutional provision requiring just compensation to the police power, is suggesting a more flexible approach to the problem of damage resulting from the use of
the police power. Possibly, if the Utah legislature sees fit to enact a statute permitting suit against the state, this case will be authority for the proposition that
damage resulting from the valid exercise of the police power is no longer a wrong
without a remedy.
29
The power of eminent domain must also be exercised for a public purpose.
Logically, the requirement is a moot point in an inverse eminent domain case.
But at least one court has construed this condition to deny recovery for damage
or destruction occurring by reason of the negligence of state officers or agents,
saying such destruction was obviously not for a public purpose." Other courts
distinguish merely between tort and taking, without discussion of public purpose,3'
and hold that traditional immunity applies if a tort has been committed.
The plaintiffs in Fairclough sought either damages or a writ of mandamus
forcing defendants to start condemnation proceedings. Both remedies have been
recognized and approved by various states. By far the most popular approach is a
common law action for damages. In the early case of Swift & Co. v. City of
Newport News, s2 the court said:
• . . when the provision of a constitution, as does ours . . . forbids
damage to private property, and points out no remedy, and no statute
affords one, for the invasion of the right thus secured, the provision is self-

25 Moeller v. Multnomah County, 218 Ore. 383, 345 P.2d 813 (1959); Commonwealth
v. Kelley, 314 Ky. 581, 236 S.W.2d 695 (1951).
26 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
27 Bohannon v. Camden Bend Drainage Dist., 240 Mo. App. 2d 492, 208 S.W.2d 794
(1948).
28 Pima County v. Bilby, 87 Ariz., 366, 351 P.2d 647 (1960); see 2 NicHOLS, EMINENT
DOMAIN 392-3, (3d ed. 1950). This is not as clear under a constitutional provision providing
compensation merely for a taking. Ibid. In Anselmo v. Cox, 135 Conn. 78, 60 A.2d 767
(1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 859 (1948), a temporary deprivation of access did not constitute a taking.
29

UTAH CONST. art. 1,

§ 22.

30 Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So. 2d 321 (1948).
31 E.g., Moeller v. Multnomah County, 218 Ore. 383, 345 P.2d 813 (1959); Schmutte
v. State, 147 Neb. 193, 22 N.W.2d 691, 694 (1946).
32 105 Va. 108, 52 S.E. 821 (1906).
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executing, and the common law, which provides a remedy for every wrong,
33
will furnish the appropriate action for the redress of such grievance.

For some inexplicable reason this logic did not commend itself to the Utah court.
A petition for a writ of mandamus has also received favor as a means of enforcing landowners' constitutional rights to compensation. In the case of Haycock
v. Jannarone,s4 the court in dismissing an action for trespass against a contractor
said:
The creation of such an agency with the power to condemn implies that
'the legislature will make provision to pay the award, otherwise we would
have to assume that the State intended to violate the Constitution by taking
land without compensation, a thought not to be tolerated. . . . His [land-

owner's] remedy is to require the state highway commission to fulfill their
statutory duty, which is to take proper proceedings to condemn the land.3 5
The Minnesota Supreme Court adds: "It is the ministerial duty of the commissioner to start condemnation proceedings against land that he has already
subjected to damage for highway purposes."36 The Fairclough court failed to even
consider this possibility, dismissing, it as being "without merit." If the court had
considered this alternative, it might have realized that such a writ could be issued
only against state officers. The cherished sovereign immunity would have gone
undisturbed, and the constitutional rights of Utah's citizens would have been
37
protected.
At least one court has allowed the property owner to recover on a theory of
implied contract where the highway commissioner had appropriated land without
having obtained title by formal condemnation. Under this theory, the recovery
was the value of the property taken.38
The possibility of compensation by way of legislation, upon the recommendation of the Utah Board of Examiners, is mentioned in both the majority and dissenting opinions. This board seems to function as some sort of screening agency
for legislative appropriations. It owes its existence to the fact the Utah legislature
meets only biannually, in short sessions.3" It is at best a poor substitute for judicial
redress, and the mere possibility of legislation should not dissuade the court from
enforcing the provisions of the state constitution.
As a general observation it would seem that Fairclough is contrary to the
prevailing trend of judicial thought.40 The constitutional provision 4 ' at issue is
intended to be an effective rein on over-zealous bureaucrats. This principle, which
finds embodiment in the Magna Carta, in the federal constitution, and in virtually
every state constitution, is too much a part of the American democratic heritage
to be discarded by the oversight of the legislature.
In recognizing and accepting its responsibility in a similar case, the Florida
Supreme Court said:
In the administration of constitutional guaranties, the State cannot
afford to be other than square and generous. To deprive the citizen of his
property by other than legal processes and depend on escape from the consequences under cover of plea of non-suability of the State is too anomalous

33 Id. at 824; accord, Heldt v. Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist., 196 Va. 477, 84 S.E.2d
511 (1954); Tomasek v. State, 196 Ore. 120, 248 P.2d 703 (1952); Chick Spring Water
Co. v. State Highway Dep't., 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 (1931).
34 99 N.J.L. 183, 122 Atl. 805 (1923).
35 Accord, People v. Kingery, 369 Ill.
289, 16 N.E.2d 761 (1938); Riggs v. State Rd.
Comm'n, 120 W. Va. 298, 197 S.E. 813 (1938).
36 State v. Anderson, 220 Minn. 139; 19 N.W.2d 70, 76 (1945).
37 People v. Kingery, 369 Ill.
289, 16 N.E.2d 761 (1938).
38 Dugger v. State Highway Comm'n, 185 Kan. 317, 342 P.2d 186 (1959).
39 For a complete analysis of the functions of the board and its effectiveness, see Note,
The Utah Board of Examiners, 5 UTAH L. Rav. 349 (1957).
40 See note 15 supra, and accompanying text.
41 UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 22.
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and out of step with
the spirit and letter of the law to claim protection under
42
the constitution.
Thomas A. McNish

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS - ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION - FAI.URE
OF NEW YORK EXECUTRIX TO TAKE OUT ANCILLARY LETTERS PRIOR TO FILING
CLAIM AGAINST RHODE ISLAND ESTATE HELD TO BAR MAINTENANCE OF HER
ACTION DESPITE SUBSEQUENT GRANT OF LETTERS IN RHODE ISLAND. Plaintiff
executrix, appointed in New York, brought action against the estate of a Rhode
Island sheriff for damages resulting from the sheriff's alleged non-feasance and
misfeasance in connection with the sale of real estate owned by her decedent. A
diversity action was brought in federal district court in Rhode Island. The sheriff
died on April 18, 1958; defendant was appointed executrix. She first published
notice of her appointment on May 7, 1958; plaintiff filed claim against the estate
on August 13, 1958, and defendant disallowed it. Plaintiff then filed her claim
in court on August 27, 1958, but did not obtain ancillary letters in Rhode Island
until February 23, 1960, which was after expiration of the period within which
a claim could be filed against the estate under Rhode Island law.' Plaintiff submitted an amended complaint alleging her appointment as ancillary executrix in
Rhode Island. Held: the failure of plaintiff to procure ancillary letters before
filing her claim makes a nullity of her action; there was no valid presentation
of a claim. Action dismissed. Fitch v. Firestone, 184 F. Supp. 424 (D.R.I. 1960).
The decision in this case rests on the familiar common-law rule that the
representative of a deceased person, whether he be executor or administrator,2
cannot maintain an action in his official capacity in the courts of a state or country
other than that of his appointment.3 A modem court has stated the rule:
It seems generally to be conceded that a personal representative of a
deceased person can sue or be sued, or can be a party to an action or
proceeding in his official capacity as representative, only in the state wherein he was appointed, and that his role as extended personality of the
deceased does not exist extraterritorially but only within the four comers
of the state of his appointment. .... 4
The representative of a deceased person is thus thought of as being a somewhat
artificial creature, a mere legal personality created by the state appointing hin.5
42

State Rd. Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868, 870 (1941).

1 R.I.

GEN. LAws ANN.

(1956):

§ 33-11-5: "Claims shall be filed within six (6) months from the said
first publication. Claims not filed within six (6) months from said publication shall be barred.... "
§ 33-11-4: "Any claim filed within six (6) months from said first
publication may be disallowed within six (6) months and thirty (30) days
from said first publication by the executor or administrator ....
§ 33-11-48: "Suit may be brought on a disallowed claim within six (6)
months after notice is given to the claimant that the same is disallowed...
and, unless otherwise authorized, suit on such claim shall not be brought
thereafter against the executor or administrator. ... "
2 The terms "executor" and "administrator" are essentially synonymous under modem
law [ROLLISON, WILLS § 256, p. 476 (1939)] since both derive their power from the court
appointing them [3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1445 (1935)]. The term "representative" will
be used herein to denote both.
3 Lowrance v. Central Ill. Public Service Co., 161 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. Ill. 1958);
Derrick v. New England Greyhound Lines, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 496 (D. Mass. 1957); Wilcox
v. District Court, 2 Utah 2d 227, 272 P.2d 157 (1954); Moore v. Smith, 177 Va. 621, 15
S.E.2d 48 (1941); Brown v. Boston & M.R. Co., 383 Mass. 192, 186 N.E. 59 (1933);
Ferguson v. Harder, 141 Misc. 466, 252 N.Y. Supp. 783 (Sup. Ct. 1931); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAwS § 507 (1934); 34 C.J.S., Executors and Administrators § 1008 (1942).
4 Wilcox v. District Court, 2 Utah 2d 227, 272 P.2d 157 (1954).
5 Derrick v. New England Greyhound Lines, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 496 (D. Mass. 1957);
Wilcox v. District Court, 2 Utah 2d 227, 272 P.2d 157 (1954).
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As such, he cannot claim recognition in a foreign jurisdiction. 6 Once ancillary
letters are issued to him by the foreign jurisdiction, however, this defect is remedied
and the representative is empowered to maintain actions in his official capacity
in the courts of the state granting the letters. Applying this rationale, the judge
in the present case held that the New York executrix' actions in Rhode Island
prior to taking out ancillary letters were a nullity. It was therefore held that she
could not maintain her action by filing an amended complaint (alleging ancillary
appointment) since there was, so t& speak, nothing to amend. The effect of this
ruling was to bury plaintiffs cause of action since the state statute of limitations
had run out on the filing of claims against defendant's decedent's estate.7 It was
too late for the plaintiff to start over. The decision in Fitch can be examined
in the light of two questions: (1) How desirable is the general rule that an administrator or executor cannot function in his official capacity outside the state
of his appointment? 8 (2) Should ancillary letters, once obtained, relate back to
validate the prior acts of the representative acting in his official capacity?9
Despite the conceptionalistic arguments advanced in support of the commonlaw rule, stated in (1), above, the actual driving force behind the doctrine seems
to be the convenience of local creditors which militates against allowing a foreign
representative to remove local assets of the estate to a foreign jurisdiction before
the local creditors have been satisfied.' 0 An early court pointed out the evils which,
it felt, would accompany a policy of allowing a foreign representative to sue without first taking out ancillary letters:
By adopting such a principle the effects or credits of a testator or
intestate, found in this state, might be withdrawn, which may be necessary
for satisfying debts due from such testator or intestate to citizens of this
state.1"

In a much later case, this same policy of protecting local creditors was said to
be the sole reason for the rule:
It has been repeatedly observed that the reason for insisting that
a foreign administrator obtain ancillary letters before suing in another
State is to assure that the decedent's domestic creditors shall have their
claims 2paid out of any fund recovered for the benefit of the debtor's
estate.'

This practical policy argument in support of denying the right to sue until after
ancillary appointment seems weak in view of the fact that foreign creditors are
usually allowed to file claims' 3 and local creditors are entitled only to their fair
pro rata share of the whole estate regardless of the assets of the estate located in
the forum state.' 4 Moreover, it may be reasonably inferred from the Supreme
Court decision in the case of Blake v. McClung"5 that any discrimination against
6

Cases cited supra note 3. For a comparison of the powers of administrators in America,
OF LAWS ch. 73 (1958).

Great Britain and the civil law countries see 4 RABEL, CONFLICT
7 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-11-48 (1956); supra note 1.

8 For a general criticism of the rule see Cheatham, The Statutory Successor, the Receiver, and the Executor in the Conflict of Laws, 44 COLum. L. R.v. 549 (1944). Cf. Basye,
Dispensing with Administration, 44 MIcH. L. Rav. 329 (1945).
9 For a discussion of the retroactive effect of a grant of letters of administration see
ROLLISON, WILLS § 256 (1939).
10 Wiener v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 298 N.Y. 346, 83 N.E.2d 673 (1949);
Ghilain v. Couture, 84 N.H. 48, 146 Ad. 395 (1929); Boulden v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 205
Pa. 264, 54 AtI. 906 (1903); Taylor v. Syme, 162 N.Y. 513, 57 N.E. 83 (1900); Toronto
General Trust Co. v. Chicago, Burlington & Q. Ry. Co., 123 N.Y. 37, 25 N.E. 198 (1890);
Stearns v. Burnham, 5 Me. 261 (1828).
11 Stearns v. Burnham, supra note 10 at 263.
12 Wiener v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 298 N.Y. 346, 83 N.E.2d 673 (1949).
13 Sackett v. Osgood, 149 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
14 In re Estate of Brauns, 276 Mich. 568, 268 N.W. 890 (1936). But see Gibbs v.
Hubbard, 73 Wyo. 425, 280 P.2d 556 (1955); Owsley v. Bowden, 161 Ga. 884, 132 S.E. 70

(1925).
15

172 U.S. 239 (1898).
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out-of-state creditors would be unconstitutional. Since, therefore, the local creditors
apparently cannot be placed in a better position than foreign creditors, even if
the assets of the estate are administered locally, the practical justification for the
common-law rule is questionable.16
More convincing arguments have been advanced in support of abandoning

the common-law rule.' 7 A unified administration of a decedent's estate would

avoid duplication, confusion, and waste more successfully than the common-law
system involving the appointment of a representative in each state wherein assets
of the estate are located. 1 8 The general unworkability of the common-law system

has given rise to a number of judicially-created exceptions to the general rule
that a foreign representative cannot maintain an action without obtaining ancillary

letters. Thus, a foreign representative is allowed to sue in connection with judg-

ments obtained in a foreign jurisdiction, 9 choses in action arising after his appointment,20 possession of land, 2' or stock certificates. 22 It has even been held that

a foreign representative will be given standing in court, without ancillary letters,

when failure to do so would result in "a failure of justice." 2 In addition to the
court-made exceptions, over half of the states have enacted statutes to the effect
that a foreign representative has the power to sue (at least for some purposes)
without taking out ancillary letters in the forum state. 24 In summary, it would
seem that the practical and theoretical grounds for the common-law rule are rather
insubstantial. 25 The numerous exceptions, both legislative and judicial, which have
been made to the rule are quite inconsistent with the rule that a foreign repre26
sentative has no existence outside the state of his appointment.
16

See Cheatham, supra note 8;

MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
RESENTATIVES ACT.

17
18
19

STATE

HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMLAWS 320 (1944); UNIFORM POWERS OF FOREIGN REP-

See Basye, supra note 8.
Cf. ATXINSON, WILLS 587 (1953).
Schlorer v. Mangin, 39 F. Supp. 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).

20 VonLingen v. Field, 154 Md. 638, 141 At. 390 (1928).
21 Bradley v. Burke, 67 Pa. D. &. C. 239 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1948); Richards v. Pierce, 44 Mich.
444, 7 N.W. 54 (1880).
22

§

North v. Ringling, 187 Misc. 621, 63 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1946).

23 Ibid., Kirkbride v. Van Note, 275 N.Y. 244, 4 N.E.2d 852 (1937).
24 ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 151 (1960); ARK. STAT. § 27-805 (1947); COLO. RaV. STAT.
152-6-7

(1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,

§§

1561,

1562 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
(Smith-

734.30 (1944); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-2401 (1959); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 419
Hurd 1941); IND. STAT. ANN. § 7-753 (Burns 1953); Ky. REV. STAT. § 395.170
MD.ANN. CODE art. 93, § 83 (1957) (applies only to representatives appointed in
trict of Columbia); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.05 (1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 622

(1955);
the Dis(1957);

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 507.020 (1952); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-807 (1956); N. H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 554:35 (Supp. 1959) (applies only to mortgaging decedents' lands); N. J. Rv.
STAT. § 3A:12-7 (1953); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-9 (1953); N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW
§ 160 (Supp. 1960); N.D. REV. CODE § 28-0202 (1943); OHO REV. CoDE ANN. § 2113.75
(Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 262 (1937); PA. ST'AT. ANN. tit. 21, § 282 (1955)
(applies only to mortgage foreclosure); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-18-26 (1956); S. D.
CODE § 35.1103 (Supp. 1960); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 287.16 (1958); D. C. CODE ANN.

§ 20-505 (1951).

25 The New York statute cited in note 24, supra, is a re-enactment, in modified form,
of a similar statute which was enacted in 1911 and repealed in 1926. The conflicting arguments in favor of allowing a foreign representative to sue without obtaining ancillary letters
are well set out in

17TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF

NEW YORK 153-170 (1951). The Council recommended the re-enactment of the repealed
law in modified form.
26 A further inconsistency may lie in the fact that the defendant who is sued by a
foreign representative must plead lack of capacity to sue on the part of the plaintiff, or the
defense will be considered waived. It would seem that, if the foreign representative is really
non-existent outside his own state, no failure of pleading on the part of the defendant could
call him into existence. The general rule is stated in 21 AM. JuR. EXECUTORS AND AUMINISTRATORS § 984 (1939):
Since it is generally held that the disability of an executor or administrator
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As stated above 2 7 the present case can also be examined with respect to the
court's indisposition to apply the "relation back" theory as a means of allowing
the plaintiff to maintain her action. The practice is quite common in the case
of a domiciliary representative and has been described as follows:
"Relation" is defined as a fiction of law by which an act or instrument
is from necessity and for the advancement of justice, permitted 'to take
effect at a time anterior to its actual performance or execution....
The
doctrine is applied only to subserve the ends of justice.2 8

Another authority states:
In the interval of time between the death of the deceased and
the granting of letters the legal title to the personal property is in suspense, or in the keeping of the law, and vests in no one; there is no person who can sue or be sued for it. But upon the grant of letters, the
29
letters, for certain purposes, relate back to the death of the deceased.

On principle, there would seem to be no sound policy against allowing ancillary
letters to relate back so as to validate prior actions of a foreign representative. This
has been done in a number of cases.30 By the same token, ancillary letters can relate
back so as to permit maintenance of an action against a representative which was
commenced prior to his appointment.3 ' The court in the present case recognized
that the question of retroactive effect of ancillary letters would determine the
result reached. Since the question was one of first impression in Rhode Island, it
devolved upon the federal judge to make an "informed prophecy" 3 2 as to how the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island would decide the issue should it ever arise before that court. 33 In doing this, the following result was reached:
Where, as here, the power purportedly exercised by the foreign
executrix is derived wholly from her official capacity as the representative of said estate in New York, I am constrained to conclude that the
courts of Rhode Island would treat her act as a nullity.
Since there has been no valid presentment of the claim upon which
this action is based, it follows that this Court is without jurisdiction to

to sue inan ancillary jurisdiction without qualifying therein attaches to the
person of the plaintiff, and not to the subject matter of the action, the
courts generally agree that the disability must be seasonably and properly
pleaded to constitute a bar to the action. Such objection, being dilatory
in nature, should be raised by a plea in abatement, or a special plea in bar
designed for the purpose, unless the plaintiff's lack of capacity to sue appears on the face of the complaint, in which case a special demurrer will
lie. Such objection has been deemed waived by a failure to interpose a plea
in abatement, by failure to demur, especially where such objection appears
on the face of the complaint, petition, or declaration, and by pleading
to the merits in actions at law. It should be noted, however, that a different
view has been taken in equity. Lack of knowledge that the representative
is not qualified within the state has been held no excuse for failure to make
a timely and proper objection.
27 See text accompanying note 11, supra.
28 Brooks v. McComb, 38 Fed. 317, 319 (D.Kan. 1889).
29 ROLLiSON, WILLS § 256, p. 476 (1939).
30 Smith v. Potomac Edison Co., 165 F. Supp. 681 (D. Md. 1958); Gross v. Hocker,
243 Iowa 291, 51 N.W.2d 466 (1952); Leahy v. Haworth, 141 Fed. 850 (8th Cir. 1905);
Hodges v. Kimball, 91 Fed. 845 (4th Cir. 1899); Brooks v. McComb, 38 Fed. 317 (D. Kan.
1889). Contra, Winbigler v. Shattuck, 50 Cal. App. 562, 195 Pac. 707 (1920).
31 Behnke v. Geib, 169 F. Supp. 647 (D. Md. 1959).
32 Fitch v. Firestbne, 184 F. Supp. 424, 428 (D.R.I. 1960).
33 Accord, Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n v. Cohen, 194 F.2d 232, 241 (8th
Cir. 1952):
In determining what the State law is there are several criteria. Of course,
if there be an applicable State statute or decision, such must govern the
United States Courts. If there be no such statute or decision, other aids
must be sought. The problem then becomes one of an informed prophecy
as to what the State courts would probably decide were the issue before
them.
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Accordingly this action is hereby dismissed for want
entertain the 3same.
of jurisdiction. 4
It would seem that, inherent in this decision, the Federal District Court of
Rhode Island has reaffirmed, in all its rigor, the common-law rule which precludes
suit by a foreign representative. As has been indicated above, this common-law
rule is now open to serious question, both from a practical and conceptionalistic
36
35
point of view. This was recognized in the case of Kruskal v. United States,
where the court said, speaking of the rule: "This fundamentally artificial rule of
the common law has been severely criticized and seems destined to an appropriate
interment in due course."37 It is submitted that, in the light of present-day conditions, the common-law rule should be mitigated, if not abandoned entirely.
Furthermore, even if the common-law rule is upheld, there would still seem to
be no justification for denying retroactive effect to the ancillary letters when they
are obtained,38 as in Fitch, before the hearing of the case. Chancellor Kent seems
to have expressed a more "modern" outlook in 1822:
• . . (I)f the party sues as executor or administrator, without probate
or taking out letters of administration, the taking them out at any time
before the hearing will cure the defect and relate back so as to make
beginning. . . . In a light so merely formal is
the bill good from the
that omission viewed. 39
Daniel J. Manelli
STATE COURT DENIED JURISDICTION UNDER
LABOR LAW - JURISDICTION "ARGUABLY SUBJECT" RULE TO REINSTATE OUSTED MEMBER TO UNIoN.-Appellee

Samuel Wax was expelled from the local and international divisions of the Mailer's
Union on August 31, 1956. Wax brought an equity action in the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas against the union seeking reinstatement and damages,
alleging that his expulsion was invalid and that as a result he had been unable
to get work as a mailer. The union appealed from a dismissal of its preliminary
objections to Wax's complaint, grounded on the lower court's lack of jurisdiction.
On immediate appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held: reversed. A
state court may not entertain any action based on facts which might be "arguably
subject" to provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act unless jurisdiction had first been
refused by the National Labor Relations Board. Wax v. Int'l Mailer's Union, 400
Pa. 173, 161 A.2d 603 (1960).
Wax is the first state court decision to decide whether the state court jurisdiction doctrine of United Const. Workers v. Laburnum1 is limited to acts of violence
as a result of the "arguably subject" rule laid down in the second Garmon2 case.
The enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 greatly intensified the problem
as to where to draw the line between those cases which were the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board and those still left to the state and
federal courts.4
One of the major problem areas was the handling of disputes growing out
of the expulsion of a member from a union. The anomaly in these situations was
that the facts alleged in the complaints might have been considered violations
of the act, but the National Labor Relations Board, the exclusive tribunal for
34
35

Fitch v. Firestone, 184 F. Supp. 424, 428 (D.R.I. 1960).
See Note, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 518 (1950); Cheatham, supra note 8.
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38
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Id. at 739.
See, cases cited supra, note 30.
Doolittle v. Lewis, 7 Johns. ch. 45, 11 Am. Dec. 389, 393 (N.Y. 1822).

36

178 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1949).

1 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
2 San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
3 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141.
4 Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 348
U.S. 468 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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violations of the act,5 could not grant the desired remedy - reinstatement into
the union." This conflict was reflected by contemporaneous decisions in several
circuit courts. The Ninth Circuit held that since the act provided for redress
and a corresponding remedy these cases came under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Board 7 whereas the Sixth Circuit8 sustained, in opposition, a district court's
allowance of a state court's jurisdiction because the Board's remedies were inadequate. In 1957 the Supreme Court considered the issue in I.A.M. v. Gonzales,9
and upheld a California decision 0 which granted an ousted union member reinstatement for an illegal expulsion. Damages for loss of work and mental distress
were also decreed. In California union membership gives rise to a contractual relationship between the member and the union. The court therefore felt an illegal
expulsion was a breach of the contract. In his complaint, Gonzales had alleged
that his ouster precluded him from getting a job because of a hiring hall provision
in the employer-union contract; part of his damages were measured by the monetary loss resulting from his deprivation of work. The Supreme Court decided that
protection of union members in their rights as members was not an area that was
undertaken by federal law, and despite the realization that the loss of work allegation was possibly a violation of Section 8(b) (2) of the Taft-Hartley Act,"' they
refused to deny the states the right to handle these disputes. The Court reasoned2
that to do so would deprive an unjustly ousted member of his contractual rights.'
The main distinction between Gonzales and other pre-emption cases lies in the
Gonzales Court's emphasis upon remedies, or rather the lack of them.
Thus, it would seem apparent that the Gonzales decision gave state courts
the right to handle disputes involving internal union affairs and Wax relied upon
this decision in his claim before the Pennsylvania court. The Pennsylvania court,
however, felt that the Court, through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who indicated
when he wrote the Gonzales opinion that he needed "a more compelling indication'of congressional will"' 3 to deprive the states of their traditional power, modified Gonzales in San Diego Unions v. Garmon.'4 The Pennsylvania tribunal held
that Garmon either effectively undercut Gonzales or severely limited it to its facts.' 5
5 Section 8(a) (3) of the Act provides that no employer shall justify any discrimination
against an employee for non-membership in a labor organization if he has reasonable grounds
for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure
of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
6 Section 10(c) of the Act only provides for job reinstatement with back pay.
7 Born v. Laube, 213 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1954).
8 U.A.W. v. Hinz, 218 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1955).
9 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
10 142 Cal. App. 2d. 207, 298 P.2d 92 (1956).
11 Section 8(b) (2) provides that to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to discriminate against
an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or
terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the
initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership shall
be an unfair labor practice by a labor organization or its agents.
12 I.A.M. v. Gonzales, supra note 9, at 621:
The National Labor Relations Board could not have given respondent the
relief that California gave him according to its local law of contracts and
damages. Although, if the union's conduct constituted an unfair labor
practice, the Board might possibly have been empowered to award back
pay, in no event could it mulct in damages for mental and physical suffering. And the possibility of partial relief from the Board does not, in such
a case as is here presented, deprive a party of available state remedies
for damages suffered.
13 I.A.M. v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620 (1958).
14 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
15 Construing the Garmon decision, the Wax court commented, at 161 A.2d 608:
In the Garnon decision, Justice Frankfurter dismisses the Gonzales decision as one involving a situation where the activity regulated was a mere-
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Garmon involved a dispute between an employer and a picketing union attempting to force his employees to join the union. The employer petitioned the
Board to obtain a cease and desist order enjoining the union picketing. The Board
dismissed the complaint because the employer did not meet its monetary standards, and the employer proceeded to the California courts seeking an injunction
and damages. The California court granted both.16 After a second appeal, the
Supreme Court set aside the damage award and established the rule that, when
an activity is "arguably subject" to Section 7 or Section 8 of the Act, the state
and federal courts must defer to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board. It was the "arguably subject" rule that the Pennsylvania court
used to dismiss the Wax petition.
The Wax court felt that Gonzales was given relief because he had claimed
injury to his "union member" relationship, but that Wax was pleading for relief
because of damage to his "employment" relationship. It was only upon this semantic
difference that the Pennsylvania court was able to distinguish Wax from Gonzales.
The court conceded that they would have granted relief if Wax had asserted damage
to his "union member" relationship.
It is conceded that Wax, by claiming that one of the results of his loss of
membership was his inability to get a job, might have alleged an unfair labor
practice. However, it must be admitted, Wax did not desire the Board's remedy
nor did he seek it. It was specifically for this type of situation that Justice Frankfurter devoted a pertinent but unheeded portion of the ill-construed Garmon decision. Elucidating the matter, Justice Frankfurter stated:
However, due regard for the presupposition of our embracing federal
system, including the principle of diffusion of power not as a matter of
doctrinaire localism but as a promoter of democracy, has required us not
to find withdrawal from the states of power to regulate where the activity
regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act. I.A.M. v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620 (1958).17
It would seem that only by completely eliminating the peripheral areas, as Justice
Cohen, writing the Wax opinion, attempts to do, may the semblance of logic
be imputed to this position. But it is contradictory of the explicit language of
Garmon to eliminate the peripheral area. And to so use the Garmon decision as
authority for severe limitation would be to completely misconstrue the decision.
However, even if Gonzales were to be severely limited, Wax still should have been
given relief. A closer analysis reveals that the essential facts in Wax and Gonzales
were the same, for in both instances union members were suing in state courts
for damages and reinstatement to their respective unions.
The Wax court attempts to distinguish the two cases in that Gonzales alleged
harm to his union member relationship while Wax claimed harm to his employment relationship. What the Wax court failed to realize was that damage to Wax's
employment was only one of the results of his union ouster. Wax necessarily
suffered damages similar to those incurred by Gonzales, for his ouster necessarily
destroyed the union member relationship. The damage for the harm to the employment relationship was merely an additional claim and not the only or allimportant allegation made by Wax.
Job reinstatement does not compensate for all the damages which result from
loss of union membership. A union member might have contributed over a period
of years to a union health and welfare or pension plan, the benefits of which
probably would be lost. While in theory, a worker can labor in a union shop after he
loses his membership, this is ofttimes not the case. Yet, even though the NLRB could
ly peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act (359 U.S. at

16
17

page 243, 79 S. Ct. at page 779), thereby indicating that Gonzales at
most will be limited to its facts.

San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d. 473 (1958).
San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959).
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not give Wax that which was the most important to him, the Pennsylvania tribunal
denied him the relief sought on the basis of a doubtful assumption that the loss
of work was Wax's sole damage.
It was precisely because of the potential loss of benefits mentioned that the
Gonzales Court was willing to overlook the possibility of an unfair labor practice
and concern itself with the available remedies. A similar line of reasoning espoused
in the Wax case would have allowed the court to disregard the claim for damages
for loss of employment and concern itself with the essential remedy - reinstatement to the union.
The Labor Management Relations Act was not enacted to handle internal
disputes between unions and their members. The act was set up to protect workers'
rights which were granted under Section 7 of the act; it is the settling of disputes
involving deprivations of these rights with which the Board is primarily concerned.
The effect of Wax on future Pennsylvania cases is debatable, but it would
seem that the National Labor Relations Board will determine whether the state
has jurisdiction should a defendant union raise the defense of pre-emption, asserting
the complaint alleges an unfair labor practice. This creates a problem, however,
inasmuch as the plaintiff will not be able to choose the forum he desires until
the Board resolves the jurisdictional question. A possible solution to this dilemma
lies in the Board's policy of granting advisory opinions concerning jurisdiction
when there is a case pending before the state courts.18 This would eliminate the
necessity of the state court dismissing the complaint and Garmon would still be
effectual since the Board would be making the decision as to jurisdiction.
Stanley B. Nelson
OIL AND GAS - TAXATION - EFFECT OF TAx SALE OF SURFACE ON PREThis was an action brought to quiet
VIOUSLY SEVERED MINERAL INTEREST. -

title to certain mineral estates by heirs and assigns of the original patent owner
of the entire estate against parties (Trenary interests) deraigning their title from
various resale tax deeds stemming from a tax sale of the land for delinquent ad
valorem taxes. Prior to the tax sale the original patent owner had conveyed the
land, reserving in himself a majority interest in the oil and gas in place. Under
a lease executed by the original patent owner to Hercules Oil and Gas Co. (Hercules
lease), gas was being produced and taxed on a gross production basis at the time
of the tax sale of the land, but the production subsequently ceased and the lease
was abandoned. The Trenary interests then executed an oil and gas lease, reserving a one-eighth royalty to W. R. Yeager (Yeager lease), whose assigns discovered and produced oil on the land. The trial court held that by reason of
production of gas under the original lease, prior to the delinquency of the ad
valorem taxes, the mineral estate was severed from the whole estate and survived
the tax sale until such time as the lease was abandoned. The right to the leased
interest then passed to the resale tax deed purchasers as they held the possibility
of reverter, and hence the Yeager lease was validly executed. On appeal, held,
judgment vacated, and cause remanded for new trial. The possibility of reverter
did not pass by the tax deed, but was relieved from the general ad valorem tax
lien by the payment of a gross production tax on the gas then being produced.
Secondly, the production of the gas and payment of gross production tax on it
severed both the oil and gas interests. The court also held that the right to lease
the mineral interest did not pass to the tax deed purchaser, but-was pre-empted
and remained in the chain of title emanating from the original owners of this
interest. Dilworth v. Fortier,354 P.2d 1091 (Okla. 1960).
The law of oil and gas in producing states is distinguishable on the basis of
18 N.L.R.B. Rules and Regulations, series 8, § 102.98-.110.
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the classification of ownership assigned to oil and gas in place.' Where the absolute ownership theory is followed, the oil and gas are said to be capable of separate
and distinct ownership apart from the land estate, but until such severance they
remain a part of the land.2 The other theory is based on nonownership, or exclusive right, and evolved from the concept of oil and gas being fugacious minerals
which must be reduced to possession or "captured" before ownership becomes
absolute.3 According to this latter theory the oil and gas interest capable of being
sold by an absolute owner of the land is merely the exclusive right to enter on
the land and drill. Oklahoma follows this theory, although it has modified it
by saying that an interest in oil, gas, or other minerals is an interest in the land
itself, and creates a separate estate therein. 4 Under both theories separate ownership of the interests beneath the surface is allowed whether such is termed a
separate estate, right, title, or interest.5
The most common means by which a landowner effects a severance of his
oil and gas interests are by deed,6 by reservation in a deed, 7 or by execution of
a lease, in some jurisdictions." The Dilworth case represents the Oklahoma rule
that an oil and gas lease will operate as a severance of the mineral interest when
there has been mineral production. When a lease is executed, the landowner is
said to retain three interests: ownership of the land subject to the lease, the right
to receive the royalties under the lease, and a reversionary fee interest to the
minerals in place.9
In most jurisdictions, notably those following the ownership theory, such
severance of title will effectively prevent the mineral interest passing to a tax
deed purchaser when the land is sold for delinquent taxes.' 0 If the mineral interest was separately taxed and the taxes have been paid, the tax title will definitely not include the severed mineral interest." Separate assessment and taxation of
a severed mineral interest is allowed in all absolute ownership jurisdictions except Montana, and in most which follow the exclusive right theory.' 2 Oklahoma
does not permit separate taxation of severed mineral interests, but taxes them as
part of the surface estate, except when there is production. 13 The basis of this
1 SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK
LAWYER 250, 252 (1960).
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§ 12 (1955); Note, 35
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2 Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 234, 176 S.W. 717 (1915).
3 Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Glassell, 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936).
4 Cornelius v. Jackson, 201 Okla. 662, 209 P.2d 166, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 906
(1949); Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86 (1918). But, by statute, absolute owner-

ship of natural gas in place is permitted:

OKLA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 52, § 231 (1950).

5 Emery, The Doctrine of Severance of Estates and the Effect of Tax Titles Thereon, 22
RocKY MT. L. REV. 523, 527 (1950).
6 Jilek v. Chicago W. & F. Coal Co., 382 Ill. 241, 47 N.E.2d 96 (1943).
7 Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 160 Ark. 48, 254 S.W. 345 (1923).
8 Hager v. Stakes, 116 Tex. 453, 294 S.W. 835 (1927). Note, The Effect of Theories of
Ownership Upon the Remedies of an Oil and Gas Lessee, 27 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 613
(1952). The term of the lease and the type of right, title or interest conveyed are all important
in determining whether there has been a severance. 1A SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS §§ 151-71
(perm. ed. 1954).
9 3A SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 601 (perm. ed. 1958).
10 Armstrong v. Royalty Holding Co., 214 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1954); Mitchell v. Espinosa,
125 Colo. 267, 243 P.2d 412 (1952); Sims v. Vosburg, 43 N.M. 255, 91 P.2d 434 (1939).
Contra, McCracken v. Hummel, 43 Cal. App. 2d 302, 110 P.2d 700 (1941).
11 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Moyle, 162 Kan. 133, 175 P.2d 133 (1947).
12 Statutes in most jurisdictions provide for separate taxation of severed mineral rights.
E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 272.04 (1947); Tax. Ray. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7146 (1960). Even
where there is no such statutory provision, severed mineral interests are generally held to be
independently taxable. Appeal of Baird, 334 Pa. 410, 6 A.2d 306 (1939). 2 COOLEY, TAXATION
§ 566 (4th ed. 1924). This is not the law in Wyoming, Montana, and Oklahoma. See THORNTON, OIL AND GAS § 1237 (Supp. 1960, at 83).
13 McNaughton v. Beattie, 181 Okla. 603, 75 P.2d 400, 403 (1937):
[T]his separate taxable estate in the mineral rights exists only during the time
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refusal to tax separately stems from Oklahoma's concept of mineral interests being
a part of the land estate even when severed, plus the fact that the legislature failed
to provide for separate taxation.1 4 Yet, most jurisdictions under similar circumstances have allowed for separate taxation of the severed mineral interest before
production.' 5 The effect of this Oklahoma doctrine is to provide for two different
types of severance: title and tax. Thus, the mineral interest will pass to a tax deed
purchaser even when there is a severance of title.' 6 If, however, there is mineral
production, this will cause a severance for tax purposes under the gross production tax statute,' 7 and the mineral interest will not pass to a tax deed purchaser of
the land.'
Dilworth is unique under Oklahoma law for two reasons: 1) It presented a
new issue, i.e., whether the possibility of reverter to the oil and gas in place, which
had been activated by the abandonment of the Hercules lease, passed to the resale tax deed purchaser or stayed with the owner of the land at the time of the
tax sale. 2) Under this lease there had been only production of gas, and thus
there arose a question of whether this gas production would also sever the oil
interest, which was the only mineral being produced under the Yeager lease.
Under the first proposition, the Trenary interests, the owners of the surface
fee, sought to show that since the possibility of reverter in the minerals under the
Hercules lease was not covered by the provisions of the gross production tax statute,
it was meant to pass to their predecessor in title at the ad valorem tax sale. The
Trenarys claimed that at the time of abandonment of the Hercules lease, the title
to all the oil and gas passed to them because they held the possibility of reverter.
The court disagreed with this reasoning and held that the Trenary interests were
not vested with title to any part of the mineral estate by reason of the abandonment of the Hercules lease. The possibility of reverter could not pass to a tax deed
purchaser, because the lien for delinquent ad valorem taxes could not attach to
any element of the mineral estate, as this estate had been severed from the land
and was subject to the gross production tax instead. The gross production tax
covered this interest because it was not a tax just "on the landowner's or lessor's
interest, or of just the lessee's interest in the mineral estate," but it was one "in
lieu" of all taxes upon the entire mineral interest at such times as there was mineral
production.'9 The dissent concurred in this and quoted McNaughton v. Beattie:20
The ultimate basis of a tax deed is a valid assessment and a lien. The
lien can be no broader than the assessment, and the tax deed can be no
broader than the lien. Consequently when the mineral rights are excluded
from the assessment of the ad valorem tax because of the payment of the
gross production tax, they are excluded from the lien and cannot be conveyed
by the tax deed. 21
when production is obtained from the property and gross production tax
levied and paid thereon.... [B]efore oil or gas is discovered, or after such
production has ceased, the mineral rights are subject to ad valorem tax as
real property of the owner of the land.
14 See State v. Shamblin, 185 Okla. 126, 90 P.2d 1053 (1939).
15 Riggs v. Board of Comm'rs of Sullivan County, 181 Ind. 172, 103 N.E. 1075 (1914);
Consolidated Coal Co. of St. Louis v. Baker, 135 I1. 545, 26 N.E. 651 (1891).
16 Cornelius v. Jackson, 201 Okla. 662, 209 P.2d 166, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 906
(1949).
17 OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 821 (1951).
18 Meriwether v. Lovett, 166 Okla. 73, 26 P.2d 200 (1933).
19 Dilworth v. Fortier, 354 P.2d 1091, 1097 (Okla. 1960). The gross production tax
statute, OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 821 (1951), provided that those engaged in the production
of certain enumerated minerals, including oil and gas, were to pay a percentage tax on the gross
value of the minerals produced. This was to be "in lieu" of all taxes "upon any property rights
attached to or inherent in the right to said minerals .. . upon the mineral rights and privileges
for the minerals aforesaid belonging or appertaining to land. . .
20 181 Okla. 603, 75 P.2d 400 (1937).
21 Id. at 402-03.
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The court also denied the defendants' alternative theory, that the production
of gas, alone, could not have preserved any interest in the oil or other mineral
from passing by the tax deed. According to the majority opinion, oil and gas are
elements "invariably discovered and produced together ... are parts of the same
mineral estate; and production from said estate of either of them brings about
a severance of said estate, from the whole estate, for tax purposes." 22 Furthermore, the conveyances of the mineral interest in this land had consistently spoken
of oil and gas as the elements conveyed, and hence both were severed together
by the terms of the instruments. The dissent took the opposite position, claiming
that oil and gas are separately mentioned in the gross production tax statute and
can hardly be thought of as synonymous. The dissenting judge refused to accept
the theory of severance of the entire oil and gas estate, and held that the severance
of gas by production does not also sever any other part of the remaining mineral
estate.
The dissent logically points out that oil and gas are not synonymous, but
fails to comprehend that what is severed for tax purposes by the provisions of the
gross production tax statute is not just one mineral, but the entire mineral estate.
The mineral estate for the purposes of title severance was oil and gas, and thus
when tax severance occurred it also severed this same mineral estate. The gross
production tax is levied on just the mineral or minerals produced, but it is "in
lieu" of all other taxes on this entire mineral interest, not just on what is being
produced.
The Dilworth case points up the difference between title and tax severance;
tax severance completes title severance. Title severance is the separation of estates
or interests in land which is allowed in all states, regardless of whether the absolute
ownership or exclusive right theory is followed. But in Oklahoma, title severance
does not have the effect of total severance, as it does in most other states, because
the mineral estate is still considered part of the land and both are taxed together.
The severance becomes complete for all purposes only when there is mineral production. At this time the tax burden on the mineral interest, which has been
severed by title, is shifted from the surface fee owner to the mineral producer.
Thus, the dissent is wrong in claiming that gas alone was severed, because production, while determining the time a severance for all purposes will occur,
does not determine what will be severed. This is accomplished by the title severance.
George A. Pelletier,Jr.

TAXATION INcOME TAX - TREATMENT OF THE INTEREST AND EXPENSES
OF A NON-CORPORATE GUARANTOR; BUSINESS AND NON-BUSINESS BAD DEBTS DisTINGUISHED. Nelson was the sole stockholder of Southwest Land Improvement

Company (herein designated as Southwest). During the years 1946 through 1949,
Nelson's sole business activity was in connection with this and another wholly-owned
corporation. A bankruptcy proceeding was instituted against Southwest in 1946. In
order to reduce losses, Nelson arranged financing for Southwest, hoping that the corporation could at least complete part of the housing development for which it was
created. In order to secure funds, Nelson guaranteed loans made directly or indirectly to Southwest. On some of these loans, he also had a primary obligation.
Despite the financing, Southwest failed and Nelson, because of his guarantees,
was required to pay the loans plus interest and expenses. Southwest was not able
to fully compensate him for this. The Tax Court decided that Nelson was entitled
to deduct these payments as short term capital losses on bad debts. On appeal
to the Fifth Circuit the question raised was whether the interest and expenses
22 Dilworth v. Fortier, 354 P.2d 1091, 1097 (1960).
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paid were to be considered in the same way as the payment of the loans, or
whether they could be deducted fully as interest and expenses. Held: that the
interest and expenses were properly treated as non-business bad debt losses. Nelson
v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 1. (5th Cir. 1960).
This case, in both the Tax Court and Fifth Circuit opinions, raises and seemingly puts to rest a number of important questions about the bad debts section
of the Internal Revenue Code.'
The most basic of these issues is how to treat, for tax purposes, the payment
by a non-corporate guarantor of an indebtedness of a corporation, when that
corporation was insolvent at the time that the guarantor paid the obligation. Of
the three possible methods of treatment, the one which the Commissioner argued
for in this case is the most easily dismissed. The Commissioner proposed that
Nelson should not be allowed any deduction because his payment on the guaranty
was nothing more than a contribution to the capital of the company by a stockholder.2 In order to accept this proposal, as the Tax Court said in this case, there
would have to be a finding that, when Nelson guaranteed the loans, "he did not
expect reimbursement from Southwest in the event that he was required to respond
on his guaranty." 3 In other words, the court would have had to make a factual
finding that Nelson, when he made the guaranty, intended that any payment
he would have to make under the guaranty would be a gratuity to the corporation. 4 But the factual finding of the Tax Court was quite the opposite of this.
Nelson expected, if he was forced to pay on his guaranty, that he would be reimbursed from the sale of the undeveloped lots that Southwest owned.5 This factual6
finding is, of course, binding on the Circuit Court, unless it is clearly erroneous.
But, given the determination that this was not a contribution to capital and
that Nelson could consider his payment as a deduction, the court was still faced
with the subtle distinction between the other two methods of allowing deduction
of this payment. One method is to consider the payment as a loss "incurred in
a transaction for profit, though not connected with his trade or business. ' 7 The
other is to consider it as a bad debt loss." If the first method is applied, the taxpayer is allowed a full deduction for his payment; if the latter is used, the deduction, if it were for a non-business bad debt, would be limited to a short term
capital loss. 9 These two possible methods are mutually exclusive; if the payment
is deductible under one, it cannot be deducted under the other.' 0
Some of the Courts of Appeals have taken the view that payments such as
Nelson's are fully deductible, as losses incurred in a transaction for profit. There
are two reasons generally given for supporting this position. The Fifth Circuit
found that the Internal Revenue Code requires that for a debt to be deductible
as a bad debt, the debt must become worthless while in the hands of the taxpayer.
The court reasoned that, since the debt in a guaranty arrangement is one running
from the original debtor to the guarantor, and the original debtor was insolvent
at the time the guarantor acquired the debt, then the debt was worthless at its
origin and could not therefore be considered a bad debt. The court determined
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 23(k) [now Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 166].
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 23(g) [now Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 165(f), (g)].
3 Frank Nelson, Jr., 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mene. 776 (1958).
4 See, e.g., the reasoning of Hoyt v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1944).
5 Frank Nelson, Jr., 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 776 (1958).
6 Grace Bros., Inc. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1949); (Int. Rev. Code of
1939 § 1141(a) [now Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 7482(a)] states that the Courts of Appeals
shall have jurisdiction to review Tax Court decisions "in the same manner and to the same
extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury").
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 23(e) (2) [now Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 165(c) (2)].
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 23(k) [now Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 166].
9 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, supra note 7-8.
10 Edwards v. Allen, 216 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1954).
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that, since the payment there at issue did not constitute a bad debt loss, and since
some loss on the transaction was obvious, the loss must have been incurred in a
transaction for profit. The second reason for such a holding was, as set out in
a Third Circuit opinion, that the payment could not constitute a bad debt because, at the time it was made, the original debtor was insolvent and the taxpayer could not expect reimbursement. In other words, the taxpayer voluntarily
acquired a debt which he knew to be worthless."'
The Eighth Circuit, however, took the other tack and decided that the payin a transaction for profit,
ments may not be deducted fully as losses incurred
2
Court, in Putnam v.
Supreme
The
deductions.1
debt
to
bad
but must be limited
3
Commissioner,' resolved this conflict among the circuits by affirming the Eighth

Circuit. The Court said:
[T]he debtor's obligation to the creditor becomes an obligation to the
guarantor, not a new debt, but by subrogation, the result of the shift of the
original debt from the creditor to the guarantor who steps into the creditor's
shoes. Thus, the loss sustained by the guarantor unable to recover 4from the
debtor is by its very nature a loss from the worthlessness of a debt.'
The Supreme Court went on to explain the error in the reasoning of lower courts
which had held the other way. The Fifth Circuit argument, that the debt did
not become worthless in the hands of the taxpayer but was worthless from its
origin, assumes that when the guarantor pays the creditor, a new debt is created
between the guarantor and the original debtor, and that the debt therefore originates at the time the guaranty payment is made, at which time, of course, the
debt would be worthless, since the original debtor is insolvent. But, in fact, no
new debt is created; by subrogation the guarantor acquires the original debt,
which ran from the debtor to the creditor, which originated at the time of the
transaction between the original debtor and creditor. The debt that the guarantor
acquires by satisfying the guaranty is not, therefore, worthless from its origin.
As to the Third Circuit argument, the Supreme Court answered that the guarantor
is not in the position of one who voluntarily acquires a worthless debt, for the
guarantor's act is involuntary and his loss arises not from any gratuity, but from
the inability of the debtor to reimburse. The Supreme Court then distinguished the

case on which the Third and Fifth Circuits relied, Eckert v.Burnett.15 The Put-

nam opinion explains that the Court in that case had been confronted with an
entirely different question. The lower courts had relied on the statement in Eckert
that the debt acquired by a guarantor upon his payment under the guaranty
"; . ..was worthless when acquired. There was nothing to be charged off."':6
But in Eckert, the Court was not considering whether a payment by a guarantor
was entitled to a bad debt loss deduction, but only whether a guarantor who paid
on his guaranty by giving his own note, payable in a subsequent year, could
take a bad debt deduction during the year in which he gave the note.
As far as Nelson's deduction for the loans which he had to pay as a guarantor,
the Putnam decision cited above controls, and limits the deduction to a bad
debt. This is so well settled by the Putnam decision that Nelson did not contest
this on the appeal here considered. He did, however, contend that the Putnam
decision did not control as far as any interest or expenses which he had to pay
on these loans were concerned. The reasoning behind this contention was that
the interest and expenses were the taxpayer's and could not be considered with
the principal as bad debts; they were, rather, ordinary deductions.' 7
11

12
13
14
15
16
17

Pollack v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1954).

Putnam v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1955).
352 U.S. 82 (1956).
Id. at 85.
283 U.S. 140 (1931).
Id. at 141.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 23(b) [now Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 163(a)].
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The treatment of the interest and expenses of a guarantor seems to be a
new question. The answer depends upon whether the items are part of the principal debt guaranteed by the taxpayer, and therefore items on which the taxpayer
is entitled to reimbursement by the original debtor, or whether they are separate
from the principal debt and, as Nelson asserted, the taxpayer's own interest and
expenses. The ordinary rule in commercial transactions appears to be that a debt
includes both the principal and the interest. "Interest goes with the principal,
like the fruit with the tree."' "The term debt as used in the statute embraces
interest as well as principal."' " This same reasoning has been adopted in tax cases:
"A debt . .. ordinarily signifies an exchange of cash for a promise to return it
with an increment of interest. 20° United States v. Collier,2 1 on the other hand,
might be cited for the proposition that a taxpayer may be allowed an interest
deduction rather than a bad debt deduction for the interest he pays on an obligation entered into for the benefit of the taxpayer's wholly-owned corporation. In
that case, the taxpayer had loans made to him which he advanced to one of his
corporations. The taxpayer was allowed an interest deduction for the interest he
had paid on the loans.
The Collier case is, however, clearly distinguishable from the case under consideration; in Collier the taxpayer did not guaranty the obligations of the corporation, but instead the loans were made directly to the taxpayer. Both the loans
and the interest on them were the taxpayer's obligations to the bank and the
bank could look only to the taxpayer and not to the corporation for payment.
In the Collier case the taxpayer was paying his own interest; in Nelson the taxpayer was, by subrogation, paying the corporation's interest. What is more, as was
said in Nelson:
In the Collier case it was intimated that if the taxpayer had acted as
agent for the corporation in making the loans the tax result would have been
different. In this case it was found that the Taxpayer,
Nelson, was acting in
22
all of the transactions on behalf of Southwest.

Two final considerations would seem to resolve the argument that interest
and principal go together and that therefore the interest in this case must be
considered a bad debt deduction as to the principal. The first of these is suggested
in the language of the Restatement of Security: "The surety's reasonable outlay
includes the amount he must pay on account of the principal obligation, with interest and any other charges imposed by the principal's default." 23 Furthermore,
the Putnam case, which controls here, limited the taxpayer to a bad debt deduction not only as to the principal, but as to the interest, without any discussion
of a possibility that the two could be considered differently.
If the principal and interest are both part of the same debt, then they are
both obligations primarily of the debtor and are both transferred by subrogation
to the guarantor. Since they are obligations of the debtor, the guarantor has a
right to be reimbursed for his payment on them and therefore is limited to a bad
debt deduction. The same reasoning must be applied to any expenses incurred
in obtaining the loans, since the creditor (in this case, Southwest) was primarily
liable for them.
One consideration remains. Once it is determined that the taxpayer is limited
to a bad debt deduction on his payment, it remains to be determined whether -the
deduction will be a business or non-business bad debt deduction. The distinction

18 Himley v. Rose, 9 U.S. 312, 317 (1809).
19 Central Bank & Trust Corp. v. State, 139 Ga. 54, 76 S.E. 587, 589 (1912).
20 Park and 46th Street Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 295 N.Y. 173, 65 N.E.2d 763,

765-66 (1946). Ct.Kate Baker Sherman, 18 T.C. 746 (1952).

21 104 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1939).
22 Nelson v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1960).
23 RzSTATFMENT, SECUPRTY § 104, p. 276 (1941).
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here is critical because a deduction in full is allowed for business bad debts,2 while
a non-business bad debt is limited to a deduction as a short-term capital loss.,
A non-business bad debt is "a debt other than a debt ... the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business." 26 The Commissioner in Nelson stated that this was not incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business;
thus it could not be a business bad debt. Nelson claimed that he fell under the
reasoning of certain "promoter" cases; he said his trade or business was promoting,
organizing and dealing in businesses such as the two wholly-owned corporations
mentioned in this case. Since that is Nelson's trade or business, he argued that his
loss was from a debt incurred in his trade or business.
The "promoter" cases, which Nelson relied upon, include Giblin v. Commissioner;? Estate of Morris H. Cone;2 and Charles v. Scott.29 In all of these cases
the taxpayer was the sole stockholder in a number of corporations; the taxpayer
made loans to these corporations, which loans were never repaid, and the court allowed the taxpayer to take a business bad debt deduction. But in each of these
cases the reason for allowing the business bad debt deduction, rather than a deduction for a non-business bad debt, was that the taxpayer, independently of what he
was doing with the corporations involved in the loans, was either. in the business
of lending money to corporations 0 or in the business of organizing or promoting
corporations. 3 '

In Nelson the taxpayer was not shown to be in the business of guarantying
13 2
loans to corporations or of "continually seeking out business opportunities. 5
Nelson is in much the same position as the taxpayer in Wheeler v. Commissioner,
who was held not to come within the "promoter cases." The court in Wheeler stated:
"Here it is clear that the taxpayers did not make the advances to further any independent promoting business of their own but merely to assist the corporation in
its business. ... "34

Whether or not a taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business depends in great
measure upon the motives behind his activities. 5 It seems quite clear from the facts
of this case that Nelson's motive in guarantying the loan was an attempt to protect his investment, not because his business was guarantying corporate loans.
Nelson was a non-corporate guarantor of corporate indebtedness; his payment
on the obligation and interest under the guaranty fell squarely within the nonbusiness bad debts provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.36 The decision in
this case will probably never be remembered as a landmark in the law. But Nelson
v. Commissioner provides a review and clarification of two important principles
of tax law. It helps to brighten the grey area around the "promoter" cases. It
serves to interpret the Putnam case, and most important of all, because of the
decision as to the treatment of interest and expenses as bad debt losses, it is a
major extension of the Putnam rule. How much farther subsequent decisions will
extend this rule is difficult to predict, but Nelson serves fair notice that, where

24 Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 23(k) (1) [now Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 166(a), (b)].
25 Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 23(k) (4) [now Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 166(d)0l.
26 Ibid.
27 227 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1955).
28
54,162 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1954).
29 1 55,258 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1955).
30 Giblin v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1955); Estate of Morris H. Cone,
1154,162 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1954).
31 Charles V. Scott,
55,258 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1955).
32 Frank Nelson, Jr., 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 763, 780 (1958).
33 241 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1957).
34 Id. at 884.
35 3 PAUL & MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION,
23.06 (1934).
36 Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 23(k) (4) [now Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 166(d)].
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certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code conflict with the bad debts section,
the bad debts section has been preferred by the courts.
David T. Link
WARRANTIES FACTURERS'

DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTY CLAUSES

-

AUTOMOBILE MANU-

STANDARD WARRANTY VOID AS BEING INIMICAL TO THE PUBLIC INTER-

EST.-Henningsen purchased a new automobile manufactured by the Chrysler Corporation from Bloomfield Motors. On the reverse side of the purchase order appeared a standard automobile manufacturers' warranty.,
Nine days after the automobile was delivered to Henningsen, his wife was
injured while driving it. Henningsen and his wife joined in an action against
Chrysler and Bloomfield Motors to recover damages for the wife's injuries and
Henningsen's consequential loss. At the trial, the cause was submitted to the jury
on a theory of breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. Evidence indicated the accident was caused by a mechanical defect in the car. Verdicts were
returned for the plaintiffs against both defendants. On appeal to the New Jersey
Supreme Court, Chrysler sought reversal, mainly on the grounds of lack of privity
between it and the Henningsens and the limitations on its liability imposed by
the terms of the warranty. Held: Judgments for plaintiffs affirmed. When a manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream of trade and promotes its purchase
by the public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as such
accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate purchaser. In addition, Chrysler's
attempted disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantability is invalid as being
inimical to the public good. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960).
The early common law did not recognize implied warranties of quality in the
sale of chattels. 2 The maxim caveat emptor was generally applied to relieve the
seller from liability when the goods he sold were defective or of a poor quality.3
However, since Lord Ellenborough's nisi prius decision in Gardner v. Gray,4 it
has been generally accepted that the seller of a chattel is under some obligation to
furnish goods that are merchantable. 5
This rule was incorporated into the Uniform Sales Act, which provides that
where there is a contract to sell or a sale of goods by description, the seller impliedly
warrants that the goods are of merchantable quality.6 Although not defined in the
Sales Act, merchantable quality apparently means that the goods are "reasonably fit

1 More fully that warranty provided:
The manufacturer warrants each new motor vehicle (including original equipment placed thereon by the manufacturer except tires), chassis
or parts manufactured by it to be free from defects in material or workmanship under normal use and service. Its obligation under the warranty being
limited to making good at the factory any part or parts thereof which shall,
within ninety (90) days after delivery of such vehicle to the original purchaser or before such vehicle has been driven 4,000 miles, whichever event
shall first occur, be returned to it with transportation charges prepaid and
which its examination shall disclose to its satisfaction to have been thus
defective; this warranty being expressly in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied, and all other obligations or liabilities on its part......
With the exception of a recent modification as to duration this represents
the standard warranty used by all domestic automobile manufacturers. A
like warranty is extended to the purchaser by the dealer.
2 I WILLISTON, Sales § 228 (rev. ed. 1948).
3 Ibid.
4 171 Eng.Rep. 46 (1815).
5 Williston, supra note 2.See also Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Quality, 27
L. Rnv. 117, 120 (1943).
6

UNIFORM SALES ACT 4

15.

MINN.
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for the ordinary uses to which goods of that kind are put. ' 7 This would mean that
the seller of a new automobile, which is usually sold by description, impliedly warrants that the vehicle is reasonably fit for use as an automobile.8
Even though the law of implied warranties applies to an automobile manufacturer to the same extent that it applies to other sellers of goods, purchasers of new
automobiles have found it virtually impossible to maintain an action against the
manufacturer for breaches of implied warranties. 9 One reason is the requirement
that a plaintiff must establish privity of contract with the defendant before recovery will be allowed for an alleged breach of implied warranty. 10 Since automobile
manufacturers market their products through independent dealers, the ultimate
purchaser seldom has contractual connection with the manufacturer. The effectiveness of this barrier is demonstrated by the fact that only one decision prior to
Henningsen has permitted enforcement of an implied warranty against an automobile manufacturer." However, the days of the privity requirement as a stumbling
block to recovery are probably numbered. The trend is toward abandonment of
3
this requirement.' 2 The story of this trend is stated fully in Henningsen.1
Attention here will be focused upon the disclaimer and limitation of liability clause in
the automobile manufacturers' standard warranty, an obstacle the consumer still
faces once the privity bar is removed.
The common law recognized that the parties to a sale could include in their
contract a provision disclaiming any or all warranties.' 4 This rule was codified
into Section 71 of the Uniform Sales Act which provides that where "any right,
duty or liability would arise under a contract to sell or a sale by implication of law,
it may be negatived or varied by express agreement ....
"Nevertheless, a number
of courts, recognizing the fact that implied warranties are imposed by law for the
protection of the buyer, tend to construe disclaimer clauses narrowly. 5 By pouncing
upon loose or ambiguous language, some courts have been able to find that certain
disclaimer provisions, which apparently were meant to be broad in scope, did not
nullify implied warranties. 6 But even the strict construction courts concede that a
7
8

Prosser, supra note, 5 at 130. See also VOID, SALES 437, n. 70 (2d ed. 1959).

9

GILLAM,

Prosser, supra note 5, at 130.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 83 (1961), reviewed
in 36 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 103 (1960) (hereinafter cited as GILLAM).
10 See BOGERT AND BITTON, CASES ON SALES 603-16 (3d ed. 1956).
11 Jarnot v. Ford Motor Company, 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959); see also
GILLAM, Op. cit. supra note 9, at 84, for a collection of cases.
12 The Henningsen opinion contains a collection of all of the noteworthy cases which
have permitted recovery for breach of warranty in the absence of privity of contract. Add
to this collection: Bowel v. Zimmer Manufacturing Company, 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960)

(surgical pin); Gottsdanker v. Cutler Laboratories, 8 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Cal. App. 1960) (polio
vaccine); General Motors 'Corp. v. Dobson, 338 S.W.2d 665 (Tenn. App. 1960), cert. denied
by Tennessee Supreme Court 338 S.W. 2d 665 (1960) (automobile; jury found as a fact
that privity existed between automobile manufacturer and consumer); Jarnot v. Ford Motor
Company, 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959) (truck); see also Book Review, 36
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 103 (1960).
The summary treatment here accorded the privity requirement should not be construed
as meaning that privity is not at the present time an imposing barrier to the new car buyer.
Dimoff v. Ernie Mayer, Inc., 347 P.2d 1056 (Wash. 1960) demonstrated that privity is still
very much alive in many states. This case is especially interesting in that it limits the famous

Baxter v. Ford Motor Company, 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), to cases involving
inherently dangerous defects.

See Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960); Book Review,
LAWYER 103 (1960).
14 Alex J. Mandl, Inc. v. San Roman, 170 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1948); Myers v. Land,
314 Ky. 514, 235 S.W.2d 988 (1951).
15 VOLD, SALES 91 (2d ed. 1959).
16 E.g., McPeak v. Boker, 236 Minn. 420, 53 N.W.2d 130 (1952); Stryker v. Rusch,
82 App. Div. 2d 244, 187 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1959); Wade v. Chariot Trailer Co., 331 Mich.
576, 50 N.W.2d 162 (1951).
36
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carefully drafted instrument can, by appropriate language, exclude all warranties,
express or implied.' 7
The automobile manufacturers' and dealers' standard warranty is such an instrument. It has been in use, without substantial change, for at least 30 years.'
During this time numerous courts have had an opportunity to construe it, and none
have found it to say anything other than "this warranty being expressly in lieu of
all other obligations and liabilities. .

.

.

"'9

Not only has this clause effectively

defeated claims based upon implied warranty, but in one case that portion which
reads "and all other obligations and liabilities" was interpreted as relieving the
manufacturer from liability for alleged negligence. 20 The court in that case justified its holding by saying that "the buyer is under no compulsion to buy from the
seller and, if the buyer desires to buy from the seller, the buyer has a choice of accepting the seller's terms or going elsewhere.""1
The Henningsen court took a more realistic view of the automobile buyer's
freedom to go elsewhere if not satisfied with the seller's terms. Observing that the
warranty in issue was the uniform warranty of the Automobile Manufacturers
Association, whose membership includes every major domestic manufacturer of
automobiles, 2 the court quickly concluded that there was no place the buyer could
go to obtain better terms. Since there is no competition among car makers with
"takes it or leaves it, and he must take it to
respect to warranties,
2 the consumer
buy an automobile."
It becomes even more apparent that the purchaser is not exercising a free
choice in accepting the manufacturers' standard warranty when what he gives up
is compared with what he receives under the warranty. To illustrate, assume that
a buyer purchases a new automobile and, while driving it, before the warranty
period expires, the brakes fail because of a manufacturing defect and the buyer
is severely injured. Contrast the relief which would be available to him in the
absence of the standard warranty with his sole remedy under the warranty.
In the absence of the standard warranty, the buyer would be entitled to damages
for any loss directly and naturally flowing from the defective brakes. If the defect
was caused by negligence on the part of the manufacturer, he would have a cause
of action sounding in tort against the manufacturer. 24 Proceeding under a tort
theory he would be entitled to compensation for any loss or injury proximately
caused by the manufacturer's negligence. If the buyer could get over the privity
hurdle he would be entitled to bring action for breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability against the manufacturer. The usual measure of damages for a
breach of an implied warranty of quality is the difference between the value of
the goods in their defective condition and the value they would have had if they
had conformed to the warranty. 2" However, there is ample authority for the al-

17 See cases cited note 16 supra.
18 The Automobile Manufacturers Standard Warranty is reproduced in Bogert and Fink,
Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 ILL. REv. 400, 408 (1930).
19 See GILLAM, op. cit. supra note 9, at 176-77, for a collection of cases. See also, Dec.
DIG., SALES, key number 267.
20 Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 685
(3d Cir. 1953).
21 108 F. Supp. 659, 661(W.D. Pa. 1952).
the following as members of the Association: American Motors, Checker
22 The Court lists
Motors Corp., Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, International Harvester, Studebaker-Packard,
and Willys Motors. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69,
87 (1960).
23 Ibid.
24 Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959); MacPhersoa v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
25 Uniform Sales Act § 69(7).
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lowance of consequential damages, including damages for personal
28 injuries, in an
action arising from a breach of an implied warranty of quality.

Under the standard warranty the buyer's sole remedy is a conditional right to
receive a replacement of defective parts. The buyer must first remove the defective
part from his automobile and send it to the factory, transportation charges prepaid.
27
If the manufacturer acknowledges that the part is defective, the buyer will prethe terms of the
Under
expense.
own
his
at
sumably get a replacement to install
or for any damages that
warranty no recovery can be had for his personal injuries
may have resulted to other parts of the automobile. 28 Moreover, the defective
brakes in the above illustration may have been caused by a good part being improperly assembled. There being 29no defective part to replace, the buyer would
apparently be without any remedy.
The Henningsen court found the one-sided character of the standard warranty
especially distasteful. In the court's opinion, the automobile manufacturers used
their greatly unequal bargaining power to transform the warranty from a device
designed to protect the consumer into an effective means of escaping liabilities and
obligations imposed by law. By giving little and taking much, the manufacturers
have shifted the risk of a defective automobile to the consumer, who has no choice
but to accept dictated terms. Refusing to follow strict common law notions of freedom to contract, the court held that the standard warranty was so inimical to the
public interest as to require a declaration of its invalidity.
It is significant to note that shortly after the Henningsen opinion was published,
all of the major automobile manufacturers increased the warranty period on their
products. Beginning with the 1961 model year, the standard warranty will have
a one year or 12,000 mile duration, instead of 90 days or 4,000 miles. However,
30
If this recent modification repthe other terms remain substantially unchanged.

resents an attempt to localize Henningsen, by making the standard warranty appear
more reasonable, it would seem that the industry has selected the wrong device.
It was the inadequacy of the protection afforded the consumer and the consumer's
lack of choice in the matter that the New Jersey court quarreled about, not the

26 E.g., Gottsdonker v. Cutter Laboratories, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Cal. App. 1960); Ryan
v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931). Compare UNIFORM
SALES ACT §§ 69(6), 69(7) and 70.
27
In Cannon v. Pullion Motor Co., 230 S.C. 131, 94 S.E.2d 397 (1956), it was held
that the purchaser was not bound by the manufacturer's decision. Accord, Mills v. Maxwell
Motors Sales Corp., 105 Neb. 465, 181 N.W. 152 (1920).
28 See Bogert and Fink, supra note 18, at 413.
29 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 79 (1960).
30

American Motors'

(Rambler)

new warranty reads:

The Manufacturer warrants each new motor vehicle manufactured
by it, to be free from defects in material and workmanship under normal
use and service, its obligation under the warranty being limited to making
good at its factory any part or parts thereof, including all equipment or
trade accessories (except tires, battery and normal service maintenance
operations) supplied by the Motor Vehicle Manufacturer, which shall, within 12 months after making delivery of such vehicle to the original purchaser
or before such vehicle has been driven 12,000 miles, whichever event shall
first occur, be returned to it with transportation charges prepaid, and which
its examination shall disclose to its satisfaction to have been thus defective;
this warranty being expressly in lieu of all other warranties express or implied and of all other obligations or liabilities on its part....
American Motors advertisements all contain the phrase: "With The Strongest Guarantee
in Auto History." Ford, the first of the automobile manufacturers to extend their warranty
period, apparently believes that credit should be given where credit is due: "Ford Dealers
were the first to extend their warranty on '61 cars to 12,000 miles or one full year; whichever
comes first. Ask your dealer for details."
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duration of the warranty. The new warranty retains the illusory character of the
old. Under the old warranty the buyer received nothing. Under the new he receives three times nothing.-"
Thomas Kavadas, Jr.

31 It is of course too early to observe the impact of Henningsen on other courts. About
the time Henningsen was before the New Jersey Court, the Supreme Courts of Massachusetts,
Oklahoma and Washington, and the Tennessee Court of Appeals, had cases involving actions
against automobile dealers wherein the standard warranty was asserted as a defense. The
Oklahoma and Washington Courts had no difficulty in upholding judgments for the dealers
based upon the disclaimer clause. The Massachusetts Court did reach the same conclusion,
but remarked that "this is not the kind of an agreement which commends itself to the
sense of justice." Hall v. Everett Motor, Inc., 165 N.E.2d 107 (Mass. 1960); Norton Buick
Company v. E. W. Tune Co., 351 P.2d 731 (OkIa. 1960); Dimoff v. Ernie Mayer, Inc., 347
P.2d 1056 (Wash. 1960). The Tennessee Court of Appeals circumvented the standard
warranty by holding that the radio, television, magazine and newspaper advertisements of
the automobile manufacturer extolling the virtues of the manufacturer's product became a
part of the warranty. General Motors Corp. v. Dobson, 338 S.W.2d 665 (Tenn. App. 1960),
cert. denied by Tennessee Supreme Court, 338 S.W.2d 665 (1960).

